

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.187
28 April 1964
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVENTH MEETING

THE SECURITY

JUN 30 1964

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 April 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

(United States of America)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K LUKANOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. Manuel TELLO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV
Mr. I.I. CHEPROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM
Mr. A. ABDEL SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. S. de PALMA
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the one hundred and eighty-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): We have agreed, I think, that during the forthcoming recess all delegations should consider their positions in regard to the various collateral measures which we have been discussing; and we shall also doubtless be studying positions in regard to the aspect of general and complete disarmament on which we have spent most of our Tuesday meetings: that is, the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, to which the proposals for a minimum nuclear deterrent are related.

The Canadian delegation has no desire to end the present session on a controversial note; but we feel that there are certain views that we ought to place clearly before our colleagues of the Warsaw Pact countries in order that they may rethink some of their own positions. We do so because we feel that, unless the Warsaw Pact countries do examine some of their favourite propositions from the Western viewpoint, we are not going to make much progress towards agreement on real disarmament. The points I wish to make today are in response to arguments brought forward by the representative of Czechoslovakia on 16 April and by the representative of Poland on 21 April.

On 16 April the representative of Czechoslovakia said:

"It has been irrefutably proved that the presence of foreign troops in the territories of other States cannot be motivated by military needs to ensure the defence and security of individual States or groupings." (ENDC/PV.184, p.21)

When Mr. Zemla says that that has been irrefutably proved, the Canadian delegation was to enter an objection. It has not only not been irrefutably proved; it has not even been convincingly argued. To continue with Mr. Zemla's statement, he said:

"It is well known that the two major Powers -- namely, the Soviet Union and the United States -- rely in this respect" -- that is, for their defence and security -- "primarily on strategic missiles stationed within their national territories. The withdrawal of foreign troops would not change the existing equilibrium in any way." (ibid.).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

What sort of equilibrium did Mr. Zemla mean? He was referring to a balance of nuclear deterrence.

Mr. Khrushchev referred to this recently in a statement which the Canadian delegation quoted on 7 April (ENDC/PV.181, p.33). Mr. Khrushchev pointed out that the two sides could mutually destroy each other and hence it would be madness to initiate nuclear war. This means that there is, in effect, an approximate nuclear stalemate between the two sides. The two sides are relying on their intercontinental ballistic missiles to deter direct nuclear attack on their own territories or the outbreak of a major war.

Now, kinds of aggression other than all-out war are possible, and it only needs a short glance at European history during the past fifty years to call them to mind. Aggressions have been committed by major Powers without engaging the whole of their military forces; that is why it is considered necessary, while the conventional forces available to the Warsaw Pact Powers and especially to the Soviet Union are so powerful, that the West should have some forces able to meet the potential threat with a defence which will not involve unleashing a thermonuclear war.

What is the balance of conventional forces at the present time? I take the following figures from an authority frequently quoted here: The Military Balance, 1963-64, published by the Institute for Strategic Studies of London. Poland is said to have fourteen divisions; Czechoslovakia fourteen divisions; and Eastern Germany six divisions. The Soviet Union has in Eastern Germany and other countries west of its own borders twenty-zix armoured and motorized divisions. That makes sixty divisions in all; and there are in addition about seventy-five Soviet Union divisions in its own territory, presumably in a lower state of readiness but which could be completely mobilized in about thirty days.

How many divisions have the NATO Powers? We find that the Federal German Republic has ten divisions; the United States six; the United Kingdom two and one-third; France two under NATO command, with four others in France whose state of organization we do not know; Belgium two; the Netherlands two; and Canada an infantry brigade, or one-third of a division. This is a total of twenty-eight and two-third divisions, if we count the French divisions not presently under

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

NATO command, as compared with sixty Warsaw Pact divisions -- not counting those in Soviet Union territory. It must be perfectly clear to everybody that you cannot carry out an offensive if you are only half as strong as the opposing side. So that should be a clear enough indication that these NATO forces in Europe are purely for defence.

The representative of the Soviet Union has referred to past history -- how the Soviet Union has reduced manpower in its armed forces (ENDC/PV.184, p.27). I also should like to remind the Committee of the state of affairs in Europe from 1946 onwards. Between May 1945 and May 1946 the United States armed forces in Europe had been reduced from 3,100,000 to 391,000 men; those of the United Kingdom from 1,321,000 to 488,000; and those of Canada from 299,000 to nil. However, the Soviet Union, in contrast to that, had kept a large proportion of its war-time divisions mobilized, and continued to produce conventional armaments at a high rate. This general state of military imbalance in Europe continued until certain events in 1948 and 1949 of which I do not need to remind this Committee convinced the countries now composing the NATO alliance that this military imbalance was very dangerous for them. Lord Ismay, in his book on the first five years of NATO, writes:

"There was in fact nothing, except America's possession of the atomic bomb, to deter the Soviet Union from overrunning Western Europe. It was therefore necessary for the free countries of Europe to combine together for economic recovery and defence."

In 1950 the NATO countries had only about fourteen divisions, plus about 1,000 aircraft, while the Soviet Union alone had twenty-six divisions in Europe and some 6,000 aircraft. Those Soviet Union divisions had much more effective modern armament than those on the Western side, and there was a very great number of divisions in reserve in the territory of the Soviet Union.

The NATO nations have no intention of agreeing to changes which would bring us back to the same conditions as those under which the alliance was formed. Let us see, in this context, what would be the situation if the Soviet Union proposal for removal of all "foreign" troops and their bases from NATO Europe were put into effect. The Soviet Union troops would then be moved from East Germany

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

and other territories on which they are now stationed, and that would leave thirty-four Polish, Czechoslovak and East German divisions facing ten West German plus six French plus two Belgian plus two Netherlands divisions, a total of twenty NATO divisions.

Here is where the geographical factor comes in. The representative of Czechoslovakia, in referring to it as the "so-called geographical factor" (ENDC/PV.184, p.21), seems to be denying that geography has any influence on military operations or defence. Supposing the Soviet Union withdraws its troops in Eastern Europe to its own territory -- which could be the former East Prussia annexed to the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War --: its twenty-six divisions would be only 800 kilometres from Berlin by road, a distance which could be covered by modern armoured and motorized divisions in about two days.

Mr. Zemla quotes Mr. Noel-Baker as saying in his pamphlet "The Way to World Disarmament -- Now" that the Soviet Union's ability to operate on interior lines would not be a military advantage for it vis-à-vis the West (*ibid.*, p.22). One has the greatest respect for Mr. Noel-Baker, who has worked to promote disarmament for many long years and is an authority on disarmament negotiations; but I think that in the opinion quoted he steps a little outside his province in implying that it is no more difficult to bring effective military formations across the English Channel and the Atlantic Ocean than it is to cross such rivers as the Vistula, the Oder and the Elbe. It is well known that the Soviet Union is particularly well equipped to carry out river crossings. The Soviet Army practises this operation continually and is very expert and efficient at it. So, even if the existing bridges were destroyed, that would not be an effective obstacle to Soviet Union formations advancing from their own territories to those of the Western European countries.

We should also note that in his quoted remarks Mr. Noel-Baker used the phrase: "the Soviet Union, with parity of troops and weapons" (*ibid.*). Previously he had made the suggestion, on page 39 of the pamphlet, that the great superiority in tanks of the Soviet bloc should be reduced by a greater percentage than those of the Western countries. To tanks might be added tactical support aircraft, heavy artillery and other types of offensive armament. This is an interesting idea which Mr. Noel-Baker applied to the first stage of general disarmament.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We have no suggestion by the Soviet Union that it should reduce these armaments by a greater proportion than the West prior to general disarmament; nor is such a suggestion contained in the Soviet Union's proposals for the first stage.

The representative of Poland suggested on 21 April that the differential rate of reduction of certain armaments which I had mentioned should mean that the largest cuts should be carried out in the most dangerous types of weapons - that is, nuclear weapons and their vehicles (ENDC/PV.185, p.6). In fact what I had in mind was the idea which I have just quoted from Mr. Noel-Baker. While we do not have precise figures in regard to the superiority of the Soviet Union and its allies in these categories of armaments, it might be as much as three to one or four to one.

Mr. Lobodycz asked also:

"If the Western countries are really concerned about the alleged superiority of the socialist countries in conventional armaments, one cannot but wonder why the Western plan provides for higher levels of armed forces than the Soviet plan." (ibid., p.8).

A level of 2.1 million men is proposed in the United States draft treaty (ENDC/30), and 1.9 million proposed in the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2). These figures are fairly close together; but of course, as we all know, the number of men under arms is not nearly so important in measuring offensive capability as the number and type of armaments with which they are equipped. I have just recited the types of conventional armaments of offensive type in which the Soviet Union and its allies are superior. I have not agreed with Mr. Noel-Baker's military judgement on the particular point on which Mr. Zemla has chosen to quote him; and no doubt there are other passages in the pamphlet with which our friends in the Warsaw Pact bloc would not agree either.

I should like to take up another point in Mr. Zemla's statement of 16 April. He said:

"The foreign troops stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany are armed with nuclear weapons and their vehicles; these are maintained in combat readiness all the time and are capable of launching nuclear attacks of considerable strength deep into the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as well as that of Poland and the German Democratic Republic." (ENDC/PV.184, p.23).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

No doubt that statement is correct. However, the threat is by no means a one-sided one; and in support of this statement I shall quote the following passage, again from The Military Balance, 1963-64, in relation to Soviet Union armaments:

"The number of medium-range ballistic missiles is now stable at a total of about 750. These are deployed in sufficient numbers to deal with strategic and semi-tactical targets -- such as fighter airfields -- in Western Europe, including Britain, and in the Far East. There are two types, one with a range of 700 statute miles, the other with a range of 1,100 statute miles. They are sited near the western, southern and eastern borders of the Soviet Union, on the Pacific coast and in Siberia. The intermediate-range ballistic missile which has been operational for over a year has a two-stage liquid fuelled engine with a range of 2,100 miles. This force is still building up."

The latter statement shows why the proposals to eliminate or freeze nuclear weapons in the areas of the two Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia would not be equitable and balanced.

Mr. Zemla also referred to the West German preference for a forward strategy. That sort of strategy -- meaning the defence of Western Germany right up to its existing borders -- would hardly appear unreasonable. We do not hear that any of the Warsaw Pact States bordering on the NATO countries are not intending to defend their territories right up to their borders. The view in certain German quarters -- and elsewhere also -- that nuclear weapons might be used from the very beginning of any military conflict in Europe does not seem very different, when the final results are looked at, from the view expressed by certain Soviet strategists that any conflict in Europe would inevitably become a nuclear war.

The representatives of the Warsaw Pact countries here have repeatedly stated that their disarmament plan has the advantage that it will eliminate the danger of nuclear war in the first stage. Western countries in the past have advanced a number of arguments to show that that is, to say the least, an exaggerated claim. We repudiate the accusation which is sometimes made that we wish to maintain the danger of nuclear war. We want to get rid of it, just as every other country represented here does. The problem is: how is it to be done? We certainly have no intention of accepting a first-stage programme of eliminating nearly all nuclear

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armaments if such a programme could create an increased danger of conventional war or would leave one side in such a position that it could be tempted to use superior military force to attain some of its political objectives. The true object of this Conference is to make sure of preventing all war, not only a sudden, all-out nuclear war -- although that is admittedly the most horrible form which war might assume. The reason for this is that any war between the great Powers would sooner or later become a nuclear war.

I think everyone here would agree that the danger of the outbreak of war has diminished during the past two years while we have been carrying on our sessions; and the reasons for that are well known. It has been, in part, the effect of the adoption of several partial measures, or measures preliminary to disarmament, the last of which was the cut-back of the production of fissionable material announced last Tuesday (ENDC/131, 132). The danger would be further lessened if other preliminary measures, such as those we have been discussing during the past three months, could be adopted. Starting with such measures, there should be a gradual reduction of armaments.

It is our contention that the disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence by stages until it is completed, as stated in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), paragraph 4, and in accordance with paragraph 5 providing that all measures of disarmament should be balanced so that no State or group of States could gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all. I have tried to show that the Soviet Union's proposals for the elimination of what it calls foreign troops, or what we call allied troops, and their European bases in or before the first stage of disarmament would be potentially dangerous to the security of the NATO States. The Western countries take the position that the reduction of foreign garrisons should take place in the course of disarmament and that these garrisons will all be eliminated in the final stage, if not before. However, such reductions should take place in a balanced manner and not as proposed by the Soviet Union both in its first stage of disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) and in its collateral measure proposals (ENDC/123).

Lastly, I would recall the argument of the representative of Poland at our meeting of 21 April:

"The more radical the cuts at the very outset of the disarmament process the more speedy their implementation, the less will be the probability

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and even the physical possibility of withdrawal from disarmament obligations and the greater will be the guarantee of a successful completion of the disarmament process." (ENDC/PV.185, p.9)

We take that statement to mean that in a disarmament plan such as that contained in the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty (ENDC/30) the West might halt disarmament at some point favourable to itself and refuse to carry out any further measures. If you look at that argument from the other side, we in the West could very well point out what a disadvantageous position we should be in if the first-stage measures proposed by the Soviet Union were carried out and the Soviet Union and its allies were then to refuse to carry on the disarmament process further.

That is another reason why it seems to us that disarmament should be balanced in such a way that there are proportional reductions throughout the process in all classes of armaments, conventional as well as nuclear, so that there is no relative disadvantage or increased threat to the security of any nation at any stage. This does not offer a spurious promise of removing every danger of war in eighteen months, but it does offer a plan for the extension of disarmament as confidence increases, continuing until the final goal is reached. It proposes a tempo for disarmament that accords with human experience -- no magic; nothing supernatural. Rome was not built in a day, as the proverb says; neither was Moscow built in a day -- or even in eighteen months.

The delegation of Canada hopes that during the recess our Warsaw Pact colleagues will consider the ideas I have tried to express. I assure them that the Canadian delegation, for its part, will continue to study the objections which have been advanced against the Western proposals, and we will try to find ways of bringing the positions closer together,

Mr. LOBODYCZ (Poland): I listened with great attention to the remarks made by the representative of Canada, some of which referred to the statement made by the Polish delegation last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.185, pp.5 et seq.). The arguments advanced by Mr. Burns did not convince us, but we shall study his statement from the record and we shall reply in due course.

It has become a tradition in our two-year-old Conference that before recessing the delegations give their evaluation of the work done. It is not my intention to present a complete analysis of our three months' labours. However, I cannot resist making a few comments of a general character.

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

I hope I shall not be accused of having been over-optimistic if I state that we all expected some tangible progress in bringing closer to each other the positions of both sides on fundamental questions of disarmament and in finding agreed solutions in regard to at least some of the less complicated confidence-building measures.

We are convinced that there are no objective difficulties in making such progress. Indeed, nobody could deny that we resumed our work here in an atmosphere propitious to mutual understanding and in a favourable spirit created by the concluding of the Moscow Treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and by the United Nations resolution which prohibited the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit (A/RES/1884 (XVIII); ENDC/117). What is more, the two major Powers had embarked on a policy of mutual example, that is of parallel steps taken unilaterally, a policy which brought about some reductions in the military budgets. The recent announcements by the Governments of the Soviet Union and of the United States (ENDC/131, 132) which were warmly welcomed here a few days ago have provided yet another convincing proof that throughout the current session of the Conference there have been no insuperable objective obstacles barring the way to progress in this Committee. I deplore the fact that we have failed to seize the opportunities to move forward in our work -- opportunities which have existed throughout the whole three-month period of the current session.

Thus, for example, no progress has been recorded in closing the gap between the positions of the two sides on the question of general and complete disarmament, I spoke about this at some length last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.185, pp.5 et seq.). If anything, there has been rather some regression in the positions of the West. The Soviet proposals (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), which as early as last autumn were welcomed even by the Western countries as opening up new vistas for a rapprochement, and which were hailed by many as the greatest event in the history of disarmament negotiations in the past few years, have not met here in this Committee with an equally positive response from the Western Powers; nor have the Western Powers themselves taken any new initiative in this field during the past two years. Such a situation can by no means be considered encouraging.

However, we receive some satisfaction from noting that the need to abolish the threat of nuclear war in the initial stage of the disarmament process has been recognized in this Committee, and not only by the representatives of the socialist States. The Indian proposal (ENDC/PV.177, p.28) to accept the principle of the

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

retention of no more than a strictly limited number of missiles, as has been suggested by Mr. Gromyko, was in fact a rejection of the thesis that the world should continue to live for an indefinite period under the shadow of nuclear destruction.

I should now like to turn to the so-called collateral measures of disarmament. We have not been successful, I think, in this field either. We have even failed in agreeing on the order of business. During the past three months the Polish delegation has explained its position in detail, mainly on three topics: reduction of military budgets; prevention of the wider spread of nuclear weapons; and the concluding of a non-aggression pact between the States members of NATO and those of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. I will briefly summarize our position.

A reduction of military budgets would certainly slow down the military efforts of States and would thereby indirectly contribute to disarmament. Moreover, a cut in military expenditure would confirm the determination of States to move steadily along the road to general and complete disarmament. It would release means for peaceful uses, including economic aid to developing countries. We believe that an international agreement providing for a 10 to 15 per cent reduction of military budgets would be a good solution. In view, however, of the opposition the proposal for such an agreement encountered, the socialist States suggested issuing an appeal for unilateral budgetary cuts in accordance with the policy of mutual example (ENDC/123). The negative attitude taken by the Western Powers also towards this suggestion, which by no means would affect the interests of any of the parties, could not but disabuse the socialist delegations and, may I stress, not only the socialist delegations.

The question of banning the dissemination of nuclear weapons has been generally considered an urgent problem calling for speedy solution. The sooner we succeed in restricting the number of those possessing nuclear weapons, the greater will be our service to the cause of peace and the more meaningful will become our talks on the destruction of those weapons. Unfortunately, even before an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been reached the Western Powers are taking action which may result in a wider proliferation of nuclear weapons. I have in mind the multilateral nuclear force which is being created with the sole purpose of including the Federal Republic of Germany in the NATO nuclear "club".

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

The Polish delegation feels it necessary to stress that the acquisition by the German Bundeswehr of nuclear weapons in any form, directly or indirectly, would unavoidably bring about new international tensions, accelerate the armaments race, and introduce new frictions in the relations between the socialist countries and those belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The threat of force in the relations between the two major military groupings should be ruled out. That could be attained through a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. Such a pact would harm no State really willing to renounce the use of force. But we have failed to achieve even that.

We have specified only three measures from the lists submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States. We have done so not because we underestimate the importance of other proposals. On the contrary, we attach considerable significance to any measures which might be conducive to the lessening of tension, the increasing of confidence among nations, the strengthening of international security-- particularly in the most sensitive areas-- and the reduction of the possibility of military conflicts. We consider such measures to be helpful in achieving progress in disarmament.

The Polish Government has put forward some proposals of its own in this field. May I mention here the Polish proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1), which prompted other States to call for the creation of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world? As we have stated more than once, the proposal to denuclearize central Europe which we submitted seven years ago has retained its full validity.

The Polish Government has recently come forward with yet another proposal -- that concerning the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments in central Europe. The implementation of the Gomulka plan would be of particular importance for the security not only of Poland but also of all the countries of that region, as well as the whole of Europe. As is known, a memorandum to that effect was presented to the governments concerned some time ago.

We also recognize fully that such measures as a global reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, or the destruction of bombers would significantly promote the cause of disarmament. But such steps as the reduction of military budgets, a ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

(Mr. Lobodyoz, Poland)

and a non-aggression pact were generally considered to be the easiest to put into effect without delay, for the following reasons. The process of reducing military expenditures has actually begun, though only through unilateral cuts. The demand to stop the spread of nuclear weapons has already been included in United Nations resolutions. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact was envisaged in the Moscow communiqué of July 1963 (ENDC/101). They do not pose -- and indeed they cannot pose -- the problem of balance. The question of control is also completely irrelevant or should not create serious difficulties. But the advantages can hardly be overestimated. I would recall that all those proposals have been supported by the non-aligned countries.

Many statements have been made by high Western officials to the effect that the Western Powers are willing to continue the process of international détente, that they recognize the absurdity of war and the necessity to achieve disarmament. We do not challenge the sincerity of those professions. However, we cannot help noting that they have not always been accompanied by equally positive acts. We feel that the policy of the Western Powers has been unduly influenced by those forces which are interested in maintaining the "cold war", and sometimes even in fomenting it.

I refer particularly to those circles in the German Federal Republic which thrive on international misunderstanding and which aim at satisfying per fas et nefas their nuclear aspirations and territorial claims. They might rightly say of themselves: "I am the spirit that always denies" -- or "Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint", to use the words of Goethe, the great German poet. It is those forces which bear a great or even the main part of the responsibility for blocking a number of mutually-advantageous agreements and for the lack of stabilization and normalization in central Europe. At this juncture the Western Powers are faced with a choice between narrow and temporary political gains and world-wide responsibility for peace. Progress in the work of our Committee depends on that choice. We should like to believe that the West will eventually give priority to the interests of world peace; and we should like to see it happen sooner rather than later.

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

The conditions for such a development do exist. I spoke about this at the beginning of my statement today. I wonder whether the recent announcements concerning the slowing-down of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes have started an evolution in that direction. Such an evolution would not fail to find understanding on our part. More than that, we are always ready to meet any justifiable concerns of our Western partners.

We are confident that the forthcoming recess will not mean a standstill in the endeavours to move forward on the road of disarmament. Let us also hope that a thorough exploration during the next few weeks of the possibilities for further agreements may provide a fresh impetus for the work of the Conference. The step taken recently by the great Powers should not, I submit, remain isolated. It should be followed by other agreements so as to prove not only the usefulness but also the effectiveness of this Committee.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In accordance with the wish of the majority of the members, the Committee is apparently to suspend its work today until 9 June. We should like to believe that the period of the recess will not be wasted but will be used for serious preparatory work, so that the future activities of the Committee may yield results and lead to agreements. To this end it would be useful to take stock of the results of the discussions, to ascertain the reasons which have prevented the Committee from achieving positive results, and to eliminate them.

The main task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee was, and still is, the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. But it is precisely in regard to this problem that the results of the work of the Committee have been most unsatisfactory. What has been the reason for this?

The Soviet Government, which has taken the lead in submitting the proposal for general and complete disarmament, also during the present session of the Committee has done the utmost possible to help the negotiations to develop successfully. From the very beginning of the disarmament negotiations the Soviet Union has based itself on the premise that in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament the most important thing is to get rid of, and put an end to, the menace of nuclear war as quickly as possible. In present-day conditions this can best be achieved by reaching an agreement to carry out the physical destruction of the means whereby nuclear weapons can be delivered to their targets.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The concrete facts of international life show that this approach is shared by the peoples of the world and that the overwhelming majority of governments are in agreement with it. The ranks of those who realize the necessity of eliminating the menace of nuclear war as a matter of priority are constantly growing. Many statesmen and politicians of the West recognize, at least in their public statements, that the danger of a nuclear disaster must be eliminated. Unfortunately the practical activities of the delegations of the Western Powers in the negotiations are far from being in keeping with those statements.

The Soviet Government has indicated an effective way towards the speediest elimination of the nuclear danger by proposing to destroy, in the first stage of disarmament, all means of delivery of nuclear weapons without exception (ENDC/2). We are still convinced that this would be the best way to eliminate the menace of nuclear war. If the Soviet Government agreed to the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreed and strictly limited number of certain types of missiles until the end of the disarmament process (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), it did so merely out of a desire to make it easier to reach an agreement with the Western Powers, which kept talking about the desirability of having additional safeguards.

The discussion that has taken place has enabled all the participants in the negotiations to see all the advantages of the Soviet proposal for what a good many call the "nuclear umbrella". This proposal, by taking into account the wishes of the West, at the same time ensures the solution of the problem of eliminating the danger of nuclear war and ensures equal security for all States. The discussion has also brought out the realism of this Soviet proposal, its practical feasibility, and its fair and well-balanced character.

In putting forward the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella", the Soviet Government has outlined it in sufficient breadth and fullness to enable the parties to accept it as a basis for the drafting of corresponding provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We should like to stress once again that only the achievement of agreement on the principle underlying the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" can prepare the ground and open the way in order to discuss and work out the details and problems connected with the practical realization of the idea of a "nuclear umbrella". Otherwise such work would be pointless.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In discussing the problem of general and complete disarmament in the Committee, the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada have adopted a position which has precluded any possibility of an agreement. Instead of engaging in a serious business-like consideration of our proposal, instead of searching for ways to reach an agreement, they have engaged in what may, with every justification, be called obstruction. Another characteristic feature of the line adopted by the Western Powers in the disarmament negotiations has been their striving to turn things round in such a way as to secure for themselves unilateral military advantages instead of disarmament, instead of equal security for all.

The representatives of the Western Powers in the Committee have ignored the appeal of India (ENDC/PV.177, pp. 26 et seq.) to accept in principle the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella". Nevertheless, a positive attitude on the part of the representatives of the Western Powers in the Committee towards that appeal of the delegation of India would have created a basis for the joint elaboration of the practical details of a whole range of measures for the purpose of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament. Owing to the negative position of the Western Powers, it has so far been impossible to achieve this.

The discussion in the Committee has revealed quite clearly that the United States percentage approach (ENDC/30) to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles does not lead to eliminating the danger of nuclear war. On the contrary, it maintains that danger. It is obvious that such an approach is incompatible with the very idea of general and complete disarmament.

I should like to say a few more words about the trend on the part of the Western delegations which has emerged very distinctly during the last few meetings. They have repeated in chorus one and the same refrain; that in future the attention of the Committee should be focussed, not on disarmament measures, but on such questions as the maintenance of the nuclear balance, control, and the establishment of peace-keeping machinery. We have no doubt that the other participants in the negotiations realize perfectly well that in putting forward such proposals the representatives of the Western Powers are carrying out a diversionary manoeuvre, trying to lead the Committee away from discussing and reaching agreement on proposals aimed at eliminating the danger of nuclear war.

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But no one can evade solving the problem of eliminating the danger of nuclear war. The solution of that problem is the key to the solution of the whole problem of general and complete disarmament. To evade solving that problem would be tantamount to emasculating the work of the Committee and turning the discussion of all the other questions, however important they may be in themselves, into an academic debate.

At a previous meeting we had the opportunity to expound in great detail (ENDC/PV.184, pp. 26 et seq.) the proposals contained in the memorandum of the Soviet Government dated 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123), and their significance for the strengthening of peace and for the creation of favourable conditions for solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. Today we deem it necessary merely to stress one aspect of the matter: that even in regard to collateral measures the Committee has been unable to reach agreement owing to the negative position of the Western Powers. Even in regard to such a simple question as the reduction of military budgets the Western delegations have prevented the Committee from taking a positive decision despite the clearly-expressed desire of the majority of the participants in the negotiations.

Take a look at the position of the Western Powers on the question of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons. They are, in fact, striving for such an agreement as would sanction the plans of NATO to bring nuclear weapons within the reach of Western Germany through a so-called NATO multilateral force. The position of the United States in this matter is in flagrant contradiction with the idea of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is precisely this position of the United States that is the obstacle to an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

In summarizing the situation both in regard to collateral measures and in regard to general and complete disarmament, it is to be noted that the Western Powers have obstructed the Committee in its work in every direction. In view of the position which the Western Powers have taken in the Committee up till now, the optimism about the work of the Committee, which can be perceived in the statements of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy seems to us to be unfounded, and in any case incomprehensible unless they intend to make some constructive changes in their present positions. Negotiations are not helped by those who create an atmosphere of sham well-being around them, but by

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those who by their practical contributions pave the way to agreements. In this respect the Western Powers stand heavily in debt to the Committee, to their own peoples, and to the whole world.

It is all the things I have spoken about today, taken together, that have actually made a standstill in the work of the Committee inevitable. After all, it is a fact that during the whole time of its existence since the autumn of 1961 the Eighteen-Nation Committee has been unable to achieve a single agreement. That little that has been done towards easing international tension has been achieved, as everyone knows, outside the framework of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. As for the Committee, which has before it a large choice of measures on which agreement could be reached, it goes on marking time, wasting time and making no progress whatsoever. Even on such an extremely modest proposal as the one put forward a short while ago by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan (ENDC/PV.182, p. 15), that an appeal be made to all States to reduce their military budgets, it has not been possible to reach agreement in the Committee owing to the objections of the representative of the United States.

True, it has to be noted that a few proposals relating to disarmament measures, and to measures that would help towards slowing down the arms race and easing international tension, have been discussed fairly intensively. Those discussions, of course, have a certain positive significance in the sense that they have loosened the ground, as it were, and helped to find out an area or areas of possible agreement. It would be wrong, however, to reduce the role of the Committee to that alone. We hope that in future the Western Powers will adopt more constructive positions on the questions under consideration by the Committee, and that it will stop running idle and start working at full capacity; then, undoubtedly, it will achieve success.

We by no means flatter ourselves with the hope that a revision of the position of the United States and its allies will be an easy task. We all know that in the United States, and in other Western countries as well, there are influential forces -- armament merchants operating in close alliance with militarist elements -- who do not want to give up the armaments race and are interested in maintaining international tension. In his farewell address the former President Eisenhower drew the attention of the American nation to the danger created for the United States by the so-called "military-industrial complex". There is no doubt that this complex has an effect on

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the present position of the United States and on its general approach to the solution of the disarmament problem, which obviously fails to keep abreast of the requirements of the new international situation and is out of step with what the times demand.

The past negotiations on disarmament have clearly revealed the difference in the respective approaches to disarmament and the differing attitudes towards this problem. Whereas the Soviet Union and the other socialist States, as well as the non-aligned countries, resolutely stand for supporting the cause of general and complete disarmament and relaxing tension in the relations between States, in the countries of the Western bloc we clearly observe a retreat from this position: they take a step forward and then take two steps backward.

In general, in the world today a struggle is going on between two trends, two directions in world politics. One trend can be defined in two words: "peaceful co-existence". Those who adhere to this trend insist on the adoption of real, practical measures of disarmament, measures to reduce international tension. The other trend finds its reflection in a policy aimed at intensifying military preparations, continuing the arms race, and increasing the strain in international relations.

The first trend can be seen in such facts of our experience as the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the agreement to refrain from placing in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117); the carrying out of a certain reduction of military budgets in the Soviet Union, the United States and several other countries; the positive appreciation of the proposal made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, in his message of 31 December 1961 to Heads of States and Governments concerning the settlement of all territorial or frontier disputes solely by peaceful means through negotiations; and, lastly, the recent announcement by the Governments of three nuclear Powers -- the Soviet Union (ENDC/131), the United States (ENDC/132) and the United Kingdom -- regarding the cut-back of production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

The second trend can be seen in such facts of our experience as the growth of military budgets in the NATO countries -- in Western Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Greece, Turkey and other States. In this connexion it is impossible, to ignore the regrettable fact that the United States, after setting out to reduce its military budget and taking a step forward in that direction, is now beginning to zig-zag and is refraining from going any farther with the Soviet Union and other

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States along the path to the reduction of military budgets. A few days ago The New York Times published a report from Washington, the capital of the United States of America. This report, which referred to authoritative information emanating from the Pentagon -- that is, the United States Defense Department -- said that within the next five years the annual military expenditure of the United States would be at a level exceeding \$ 50,000 million and that no substantial decrease in this enormous military expenditure was to be expected right up to 1970; this was stated by a high-ranking official of the Pentagon.

This statement by a representative of the Pentagon is all the more surprising and distressing to all sincere advocates of the cessation of the arms race since such an authority on matters relating to the building-up of the armed forces of the United States as Mr. Gilpatric, who until recently was United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated that during the next few years it would be quite possible for the United States to reduce its military budget by 25 per cent. In the light of this statement by Mr. Gilpatric everyone realizes that this zig-zag, this deviation from the course leading to the reduction of military budgets which was announced a few days ago by a high-ranking official of the Pentagon, is not at all due to real considerations of defence but to pressure from the United States' so-called military-industrial complex.

The curve of growth of the military budget in Western Germany has been rising very rapidly. In the present military budget recently approved by the West German Bundestag the allocations for military expenditure -- that is, the military budget of that country -- have been considerably increased as compared with last year's budget. At present the proportion of allocations for military purposes in the budget of Western Germany is more than 37 per cent -- considerably more than one-third of the entire budget of the country.

This is a monstrous proportion. The very fact that the West German Government is burning such enormous resources in heating up its military machine; the fact that it is carrying on such intensive military preparations; as well as the fact of the stubborn, persistent striving on the part of Western Germany to obtain access to nuclear weapons through a so-called NATO multilateral force; and, lastly, the refusal of the Western Powers to conclude a non-aggression pact between the countries members of NATO and the States comprised in the Warsaw Treaty Organization -- all these facts cast an ominous shadow on the situation in Central Europe, the most sensitive area in the world, where the armed forces of the NATO countries and of the States comprised in the Warsaw Treaty Organization face each other.

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The second trend can also be seen in such fact as the intensification of military preparations and the intensive re-armament of the armed forces of the NATO Powers. Obsolete types of aircraft are being replaced at a feverish rate by the latest improved models, which surpass the obsolete types in speed, load-carrying capacity, ceiling and arms equipment. New types of military aircraft are being devised at an accelerated rate in the planning bureaux of the Western Powers. This process is being developed at top speed in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Western Germany. NATO military staffs are preparing and putting into practice more and more plans and projects for the utilization of science for the purpose of the mass destruction of human beings.

In this connexion it is appropriate to recall that the industrial production of poisonous substances -- lethal gases -- is being developed in the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western NATO countries. The Western press has recently published quite a lot on the subject of a so-called nerve gas. The preparation of biological means of warfare is going on at top speed. It is known that with this end in view the NATO Powers have long since organized the mass production of bacilli and bacteria with which to contaminate the human environment. Research is being carried out in order to find out more and more means for destroying people. Recently a report appeared in the Western press that in the United States an apparatus which generates tremendously concentrated beams of light and is known under the name of "Laser", has been adapted for military purposes.

In general, more and more attempts are being persistently made to utilize the greatest achievements of science, and its inexhaustible possibilities for ensuring the welfare and increasing the well-being of mankind, for the purpose of the mass destruction of human beings. Colossal amounts of money are being spent on all this. The best brains of mankind have been placed at the service of militarism and military preparations. In these days -- in the era of nuclear weapons --, when all responsible statesmen of the world recognize that war is now unthinkable, the policy of the arms race and military preparations is for all the more reason senseless and unjustified.

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It is necessary to reconsider one's attitude towards disarmament, to overcome timidity, doubts and hesitations, and resolutely to take the path of disarmament. For this the ground has been prepared and favourable pre-conditions have been brought about. We should like to hope that during the recess in the work of the Committee the Governments of the Western Powers will make a careful study of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union, take into account the discussions that have taken place in the Committee, and provide their delegations with new instructions which will enable the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to achieve progress at last in carrying out the disarmament task entrusted to it, in the accomplishment of which all the peoples of the world are vitally interested.

I should like to quote the following statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, on 20 April 1964:

"It is the deep conviction of the Soviet Government that increased efforts must be made in searching for a solution of the main problems of disarmament and in adopting ever more effective measures for strengthening universal peace. This is called for by the vital interests of all States and of all peoples. The Soviet Government is prepared to take such further steps in agreement with the other Powers." (ENDC/131, p.3).

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to mention the efficient and well-organized work of the members of the Secretariat, the interpreters and translators, and others who, despite an additional load of work due to the fact that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development is being held at the same time, have made it possible for the verbatim records and documents to be issued punctually.

I should also like to express my best wishes to our colleagues in the negotiations, in the hope that they will use the recess to achieve the maximum constructive results for the cause of disarmament, and that they will make a positive contribution so that the future work of the Committee may at last become productive.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): Before I come to my prepared text, permit me to express to the Bulgarian delegation -- and through it to the people of Bulgaria -- the most sincere condolences of my delegation at the recent death of Mr. Dimitri Ganev, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

My delegation intends to make a brief but sober appraisal of the work done by the Committee not only at this session but at the preceding sessions as well. We are the more persuaded that this approach is proper, and perhaps would be helpful, by the declared intentions of the delegations of the two parties primarily involved to utilize the period of the recess for sober reflection and, I trust, a real and helpful evaluation of their and others' positions, taking into account the various views expressed by other delegations in this Committee. At any rate we feel that after two years of talks a dispassionate review is now due; and we trust that our comments and criticism this morning will be taken in the proper spirit and will not be construed as unduly damaging to the position of either or both of the sides.

The Committee began its work over two years ago in an aura of muffled hopes and expectations. Those hopes were generated partly by the fact that the stockpiling of deadly armaments had reached such an unprecedentedly dangerous level that humanity had come to hope that the Powers primarily concerned had also come to the conclusion -- which others not so involved had arrived at much earlier -- that neither their security nor that of the world justified, or indeed could be well served by, the further intensification of the arms race. The world was further encouraged in this hope by the sober statements emanating from the capitals of the various countries, many of them made by the highest and most responsible leaders of the two sides. The addition of eight new members to this Committee also raised hopes that perhaps for the first time a real and continuous dialogue between the two sides would result.

There have been bursts of effort to achieve a rapport and sporadic attempts at a dialogue, but on the whole we cannot help feeling that the methods of the defunct Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee still haunt this Committee and stalk this

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chamber like the King's ghost in Hamlet. Indeed, my delegation is in perfect agreement with the great bard whose quatercentenary is now being celebrated -- and with Macbeth, who declared:

"If charnel-houses and our graves must send

Those that we bury back, our monuments

Shall be the maws of kites." (Macbeth 3, 4)

We feel that this hangover from the old Committee is a serious shortcoming, and we venture to hope that some serious thinking will be undertaken during this working recess by those concerned to bury this ghost really and truly. For our part, we shall contribute our quota of tears -- even if of joy -- over so successful an operation.

The primary task with which this Committee is charged, as we all know, is the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We seem to be generally agreed that this is a most worthy goal and one which should be pursued with a sense of urgency. We also seem to be in broad agreement on the principles which should guide our negotiations; but there, apparently, all agreements cease. True, we have had a few modifications to the treaties submitted by the two sides, of which we consider the recent Gromyko amendments (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) as the most significant and far-reaching. True, no one expects our goal to be achieved by a wave of the magic wand of Cinderella's godmother. Nevertheless, we cannot but note with regret the rather unsatisfactory progress made in this field. It is true, as I said recently in quoting a Nigerian saying, that "a stranger cannot see, no matter the size of his eyes"; but it is equally true, no matter how blind the stranger, that after a few days' acquaintanceship with a place he can distinguish the various natural noises. I venture to think that, although we are still relative strangers to this Committee and its work, we now belong to the latter category.

We have heard, especially this session, a tireless repetition of old and almost worn-out arguments. We must now confess that it was with great difficulty that often in the past we have restrained ourselves from interrupting some of those repetitive speeches and either directing the attention of the speaker to such-and-such a statement made by his delegation in 1962 or 1963, or volunteering to complete the statement for him, assured that we should not go very far wrong. Indeed, we have been participating in a sort of merry-go-round, with the sole difference that the mirth is lacking and that we are dizzy only in so far as boredom can make us so.

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My delegation is therefore firmly convinced that the time has come for those concerned to undertake a really serious evaluation of the situation and complexities of our work. A self-righteous attitude will not help us; indeed, it runs counter to the very spirit of negotiations. No country, we submit, has the monopoly of wisdom. Therefore we should be happy if the two sides would modify their drafts, each taking into consideration the criticism of the other side and the views expressed by the other delegations, including those from the non-aligned countries.

The two disarmament plans before us have rather differing approaches to the problem. We do not, however, consider those approaches as necessarily contradictory. Indeed, we feel that in places they are complementary and should be "married" together. But it is essential to recognize certain additional criteria for our negotiations, such as the necessity of eliminating as early as possible the threat of a nuclear holocaust hanging over humanity like the sword of Damocles. From this standpoint it might be possible to effect a radical cut in certain categories of armaments -- not necessarily an all-or-nothing approach, and not necessarily confined to nuclear delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads alone --, and a percentage cut in others, without adversely affecting the balance of power.

We feel that perhaps the time has come to take another look at our agenda on general and complete disarmament. It is true that we have a reasonably good agenda so far. But our approach could be described as that of the grasshopper: it is true that we have hopped back and forth, but with little evidence of success, and indeed with less to show for it than the grasshopper itself. We have reached more or less broad agreement regarding some areas of our work; but there is as yet no possibility of agreement in sight regarding the core of the problem: namely, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles; control and verification; and effective peace-keeping machinery. In view of the fact that each of those three elements is dependent on the others, and yet a natural and automatic order of precedence is clear; reflected in the order in which I have mentioned them, perhaps it would be worth while to take them up individually for serious consideration, even at the risk of having the old arguments inflicted on us once more.

For instance, we should subject to serious and painstaking study the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. If it is established that conventional forces and armaments have a bearing on that -- and we ourselves

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see a clear relationship -- then we can take them together in the consideration of the problem. Agreement on that would, of course, be dependent on agreement on the other two areas I have indicated. We feel that, if we attempt such a method instead of talking on various fronts at the same time with little success, we could make better progress by disposing of one before going to the other. It may be necessary to have a greater number of really serious informal meetings than we now have, possibly with competent advisers present to offer much needed clarification.

We would, however, stress the necessity for each side to take serious note of the views and criticisms of the other and to answer, as satisfactorily as it knows how, the questions and doubts expressed. We must recognize that all doubts and fears must be allayed if we are to make any real progress. We shall, however, regret attempts to raise artificial obstacles. We feel that the time for such tactics is past, and we shall be outspoken in our condemnation of any deviation from the path of true negotiations.

I shall now turn briefly to the subject of collateral measures. We have always agreed that, while pursuing our main task of elaborating a treaty on general and complete disarmament, we should seek agreements in other fields which, though not disarmament measures in themselves -- though they could also be that -- would contribute to the lessening of international tension and thus make our main task easier of attainment. We are in general agreement that such measures should receive due priority and should be pursued as vigorously as possible. Yet, up to the end of last year, with only very few and notable exceptions, the various measures proposed were either so badly conceived as to be wholly unacceptable to the other side, or were put forward without much seriousness or even, apparently, without any hope that they would be accepted.

However, with the conclusion of the Moscow partial nuclear test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the direct communication link agreement (ENDC/97), and the agreement in principle not to station nuclear weapons in orbit (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117), a new era appeared to have dawned in this field. For the first time we almost found ourselves in the fortunate position of having measures which could and should find acceptance by the two sides, either now or in the foreseeable future, provided the appropriate goodwill is not lacking.

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This session opened with what one could call a peace offensive in the field of collateral measures, as could be seen in President Johnson's message, with his list of measures proposed for discussion (ENDC/120), and in the Soviet memorandum on collateral measures (ENDC/123). We were presented with proposals for such measures as a reduction in military budgets, a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of nuclear weapons, and the physical destruction of armaments; measures aimed at drastic reduction of the stockpiling of fissionable materials (ENDC/131, 132), including a cut-back and extension of international safeguards to the nuclear Powers; a non-aggression pact between the two giant military alliances (ENDC/77); a non-dissemination agreement; and measures for the reduction of the risks of war -- to name a few of the measures about which we are strongly of the opinion that it is in the short- and long-term interest of both parties -- and I stress "both" -- to come to early agreement. What is more, we were encouraged to feel that the necessary act of political will was not lacking.

We cannot help noting, therefore, with regret and a certain feeling of disappointment, the rather poor performance of our Committee. As the Book says, "To whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required". (Luke 12, 48). There seemed to exist quite a few preconditions which would have made an agreement or two possible. It is true, of course, that we were reasonably reassured, at least concerning their preparedness to maintain the détente and resume their dialogue, by the simultaneous announcements of the nuclear Powers regarding their intention to cut back substantially their production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes.

We have already welcomed in due measure these latest exhibitions of mutual understanding. That being said, we cannot but state that the recent arrangement is by no means a satisfactory answer to the demands both of humanity and of necessity. It is like a keeper throwing a small morsel of flesh from a huge pile to a hungry caged lion. The lion would accept it with every reason to expect that further morsels would find their way to its mouth. It is unnecessary to stress that humanity, with appetite whetted by the few agreements of last year and by a perceptible relaxation in the "cold war", is really hungry for agreements and expects more morsels from the pile. However, with regard to last week's announcements on reducing fissionable materials for weapon uses, we are persuaded to believe that both sides -- as distinct from one side only -- have at last apparently reached the

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point of saturation in their production of such materials. Therefore we feel that there is no need to delay further a formal and binding agreement on this: an agreement which should aim at a complete cut-off of production and a substantial cut-back in the existing stockpile. The opportunity provided by the recent moves should not be allowed to slip by.

Regarding the other collateral measures I have mentioned, I have already had the opportunity of indicating our position (ENDC/PV.176, pp. 13 et seq.) and would spare the Committee the ordeal of my going over the old ground again. I shall confine myself, therefore, to views arrived at after further study of those proposals and more recent developments in our Committee.

We have already expressed our satisfaction over the measures proposed by both sides which could result in the first "arms bonfire" agreement of this Conference. We have the proposal by the Soviet Union for the elimination and destruction of all bombers by States (ENDC/123), and the proposal by the United States for the destruction of only one category -- the United States B-47 and the Soviet Union TU-16 (ENDC/PV.176, pp. 5 et seq.). We do not consider the two proposals necessarily opposed one to the other. Indeed, one could be a step to the other. Nevertheless, we are bound to point out in all humility that the United States proposal suffers from a rather unfortunate weakness. It is, if I might say so, rather timid and over-cautious and, while providing evidence of serious intention and determination, it fails really to touch the heart of the matter. It is like a well-meaning neighbour trying to put out a fire in a small out-building with a watering can instead of directing a strong jet from the hose lying nearby.

There is no doubt that the bombers the United States proposes for destruction are formidable engines of war for non-nuclear Powers and that the numbers involved are by no means small; but in relation to the total strength -- even in bombers -- of the United States and the Soviet Union this proposal is relatively a pin-prick. The Soviet proposal, on the other hand, appears, at least at this stage, to suffer from being too comprehensive. It is like a well-meaning traveller anxious to save a man dying of thirst in the desert. Instead of giving the poor fellow a few drops left from his small supply, he puts him on his camel and heads purposefully for the oasis. Although the oasis may be only a few miles away, one can only hope that both will get there alive.

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We have doubts about whether it is realistic to expect all States to destroy all their bombers at this stage as a collateral measure -- especially if these constitute their sole means of defence. My delegation feels, therefore, that further study should be given by the two super-Powers to their plans so that a mean could be struck between the two approaches. Something more than the United States proposal, and a modification of the Soviet Union proposal, for the destruction of bombers, with perhaps a few missiles thrown in, would be a worthy achievement as well as being a step in the right direction. It would be unfortunate if the world were robbed of an agreement either by the undue caution of one side or by the all-embracing approach of the other. This is an area in which agreement seems possible, and we should explore it determinedly.

My delegation was very much interested in the elaboration by the United States (ENDC/PV.184, pp.15 et seq.) of its proposal for a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic delivery vehicles (ENDC/120). We shall comment on this briefly and indirectly later this morning. Meanwhile I should like to welcome this proposal once more, and I venture to express the hope that after the recess, which will provide opportunity for a thorough study, the Soviet delegation will be in a position to react more favourably to this most far-reaching and significant proposal. We do regret that this proposal was somewhat late in coming; but, as the saying goes, it is better late than never, and in any case we do not think it has come really too late.

We are of the strong opinion that the general approach of the freeze proposal is a sound and timely one. We have met now for over two years, and while we talk the stockpiles of nuclear armaments increase both in quality and quantity. Indeed, we feel that the very intensification of the armaments race by the mere piling up of armaments, by the perfection of more deadly and diabolical weapons, including chemical and bacteriological weapons, and by the creation of new categories of armaments, which make our work more complicated, is contrary and diametrically opposed to the task to which I believe we are all dedicated. We therefore welcome this United States freeze proposal as we should welcome any proposal aimed at halting, in any way, the armaments race, including any proposal for a freeze of military expenditure and a reduction of budgets for war purposes, on which we continue to insist.

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My delegation has already expressed itself very clearly on this subject of military expenditure in the past (ENDC/PV.176, pp.18, 19). We regret that we do not find ourselves in full agreement with you, Mr. Chairman, as representative of the United States, on this subject. We would it were otherwise, but we are convinced of the importance of this measure; and I can only express the hope that you will be persuaded to the same view after listening to what I have to say this morning and taking into consideration the view expressed by myself and others in the past. I listened to your most interesting statement on this subject on 9 April (ENDC/PV.182, pp.27 et seq.). I was indeed happy that you had made an attempt at serious discussion of this proposal. If I may say so, you raised some really important points which must be clarified, and posed certain questions which in our view require unequivocal answers. As we attach the utmost importance to this proposal, we venture to hope that the Soviet delegation will provide the necessary answers to the most interesting and highly pertinent questions which you raised.

However, as it may not be possible for those answers to be provided before we go into recess, I venture to hope that meanwhile your Government, for its part, will take a second and really serious look at the Soviet proposal, on the understanding, of course, that your fears and doubts will be laid to rest. The question of a freeze and reduction of military budgets has a very close, and indeed inextricable, relationship to some of the proposals which you, sir, have yourself submitted to the Committee on behalf of the United States Government. The position of the United States has always been, I believe, that military budget reductions should be the consequence of cuts in armaments, and not the other way around. We have always held the view that either approach is sound and would have the same end result. Indeed, we do not consider the two approaches to be necessarily contradictory, as I shall demonstrate shortly.

Take, for instance, the question of the United States proposal (ENDC/120) for a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic delivery vehicles. The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada rightly said in his most illuminating statement at our meeting of 26 March:

"In this connexion I have noted that, in the view of the Soviet Union, while the stopping of production of strategic nuclear weapon carriers would immediately produce significant savings in one sector of the military expenditures of the greater Powers, there is a danger that the resources

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"so liberated might be used to increase the numbers of short-range missiles and conventional weapons... Perhaps this could be prevented by introducing a verified system of budgetary limitation." (ENDC/PV.178 pp.18, 19)

At this stage I should like to salute the clear-sighted approach of the Canadian Minister and to welcome most warmly this first positive reaction, and most responsive reaction, by any Western Power so far to that proposal.

However, I would carry Mr. Martin's thoughts a little further and submit that what he said about the United States freeze proposal applies equally to the destruction of bombers, the cut-back and cut-off in the production of fissionable materials, and indeed to most other proposals of a disarmament or quasi-disarmament nature. We should therefore like to ask the United States delegation -- and I trust, Mr. Chairman, that an answer will emerge from you in your other capacity as head of the United States delegation when we resume our work -- what effect the proposal for a verified freeze and some of the other proposals aforementioned would have on the over-all military budget of the United States. In other words, approximately how much would be involved and would result if agreement should be reached on any or all of those proposals?

What guarantees has the United States in mind in order to assure the world that we are not merely placing the cover on one or two sectors of armaments in order to raise the level and the temperature of others? If the United States has it in mind to give such guarantees and can forecast with reasonable accuracy -- as we are confident it can --, will it not be necessary, as a result of all this, to freeze military budgets either at an over-all level or only as regards the affected sectors, and to make a cut in military budgets proportionate to the resources which could result from the implementation of the aforementioned agreements? The cuts to be effected in the budgets need not be 10 to 15 per cent as proposed by the Soviet Union; but I venture to submit on the basis of the foregoing premises that a sort of freeze of military expenditure and a cut of some kind in the over-all military budgets reflecting the resources to be released and ensuring that we are not going to control the fires of one sector only to stoke those of other sectors of armaments in agreeing to the aforementioned proposals -- and that relevant to the consideration of this matter -- are called for even by the United States proposals themselves.

Of course, such agreed cuts in military expenditure should be subject to adequate verification; and, as I have indicated already, we await with some interest the Soviet reply to the most pertinent questions raised by the United States

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representative at our meeting of 9 April (ENDC/PV.182, pp.27 et seq.). Indeed, as I have tried to establish, my delegation sees a clear link between a cut in military expenditure and the various measures for the destruction of bombers, the United States proposal for a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic delivery vehicles, and any agreed cut-back and/or cut-off in the production of fissionable materials, among other things. Therefore we trust that this will be borne in mind during the coming period of reflection and, I hope, re-evaluation of the various proposals.

My delegation has already made its views very clear (ENDC/PV.176, pp.13 et seq.) on the other subjects which we think should receive priority attention from the Committee and on which we think agreement is not only possible but in some cases urgently necessary. Among these are an agreement on non-dissemination, a non-aggression pact between parties to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and adequate measures to reduce the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or surprise attack.

We do not intend to add anything new to what we have said on these matters, but we wish to welcome the United Kingdom working paper (ENDC/130) on measures to prevent the risk of war, submitted by the leader of its delegation, Mr. Thomas, at our 178th plenary meeting. The United States delegation had already submitted a working paper (ENDC/70) on that subject in December 1962. We think that those papers could provide a useful basis for study, and we would welcome either the reaction of the Soviet Union to those proposals or the elaboration of its own views in the not too distant future. As I have remarked in earlier speeches, the world would welcome with relief an agreement on this subject, and we venture to hope that the necessary thought will be given to this during the recess, taking into consideration the views emphasized by me in my statement at our 176th plenary meeting.

Now, if I may, I will turn briefly to a subject of great importance and urgency -- a comprehensive test ban. As the Committee is aware, the General Assembly has specifically instructed us to seek such an agreement urgently (A/RES/1910(XVIII); ENDC/116). My delegation has already touched briefly on this in previous statements, but we refrained deliberately from pressing the issue, partly because we hoped that something would be done by the nuclear Powers themselves without undue prodding, and partly because there seemed to be a tacit understanding that perhaps the less said about it at the time the better. However, we feel that the time has come to raise this matter more seriously, the more so as we are going into recess; for we are convinced

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that it is a subject which deserves the serious consideration of the nuclear Powers during this period of reflection.

I would therefore express my wholehearted support for the suggestion made by Mr. Barrington of Burma that the time has come perhaps to reactivate the three-Power Nuclear Sub-Committee, which could report to us as appropriate (ENDC/PV.178, p.36). There is enough work for that Sub-Committee to do. For instance, there is the proposal -- which we endorse -- that it is perhaps worth while to ascertain whether it would be possible to establish a threshold for underground tests above which such tests could be detected and identified by national control networks along (ENDC/PV.177, pp. 9, 10). If this were possible, it would further enlarge the Moscow partial test ban treaty and would further allay the fears of humanity. As I pointed out on 24 January, it has been established by reputable scientists that --

"... underground tests are not as free of radioactive fall-out and debris as was hitherto presumed." (ENDC/PV.159, p.12)

I should like to suggest that, in order to make the work of the Nuclear Sub-Committee really productive, it would be helpful if the Governments involved would bring their scientific experts with them. I am not necessarily suggesting a confrontation of scientists or the establishment of a technical group. I am, however, convinced that, notwithstanding the great experience of our colleagues who would presumably handle these negotiations in the Sub-Committee, considerable experience even in the particular field of nuclear weapon tests -- and here I salute the veterans in the field --, their work would no doubt be made lighter by having such expert advice within very easy reach. Frankly, we should not welcome general political statements from the Sub-Committee, as the necessary political decision stressing the need for such an agreement has been recognized by the Moscow Treaty and we hope that the political will is still present. We would welcome only a truly critical appraisal of the various suggestions made in this Committee and the United Nations, as well as other suggestions. If we work on the proper lines, I have no doubt that we shall have something concrete to report to the next session of the General Assembly.

Finally, I should like to repeat what I said in previous speeches -- especially after deploring this morning in somewhat strong terms the rather unsatisfactory progress made by the Committee thus far, and particularly during

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this session. It is indeed true that we have not lived up to the expectations. But our work here has not been altogether in vain. Furthermore, we should not be unduly despondent. Indeed, my delegation has reason to draw comfort from recent events and dares to hope, with cautious optimism, that some real progress will be made in the next or other forthcoming sessions. It is for this reason, and because we feel the time has come for some straight talk, that we have permitted ourselves to make this critical analysis of the various proposals and have dared to make some bold suggestions. We can only hope that these views will receive the serious consideration of the Committee, and in the first instance of the super-Powers. We therefore commend these views to the Committee for what they are worth.

We sincerely trust that the various Governments represented here will use the period of the recess for a thorough reappraisal of the various proposals. I join the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Peter Thomas, in appealing --

"... to all participants in the Committee to give each proposal full, proper and serious consideration; to avoid adherence to previously-adopted positions and conditions ..." (ENDC/PV.186, p.39)

I should like to conclude my statement by expressing my delegation's appreciation to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Epstein, and his staff for their never-failing co-operation. I should also like to thank the indefatigable interpreters and verbatim reporters for their excellent services and patience. And for our colleagues we can only wish a good working holiday.

Mr. ZEMLA (Czechoslovakia). After more than three months of negotiations we are going to have another recess in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee -- the sixth such recess. This is an invitation to our delegation, also, to ponder the results of our work so far. Unfortunately, as in the past, we find it necessary to state that our present negotiations, too, have had no concrete results. We cannot but express our concern at this alarming fact. It is even more serious because new opportunities have certainly been opened for the Committee's negotiations. All delegations share the view that, following the agreements reached in 1963 and the unilateral steps announced by the Government of the USSR and

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some other governments, we renewed our discussions in more favourable conditions than ever before in the past. However, the hopes have not been fulfilled, either as regards the discussions on general and complete disarmament or in the field of collateral measures.

That unsatisfactory state of affairs has not come about because the Committee has not had before it realistic proposals which might lead to agreements on effective measures. In the field of general and complete disarmament, there has been submitted to the Committee the significant proposal of the USSR on the retention of the so-called "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the disarmament process (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), a proposal which has opened the way to the solution of the most important question of general and complete disarmament: the elimination of the menace of nuclear war.

In regard to collateral measures, the Committee has had before it the memorandum of 28 January 1964 of the Government of the USSR (ENDC/123) containing the well-known nine proposals leading to a relaxation of international tension, the strengthening of confidence in the relations among States, and the slowing-down of the arms race. Apart from that, other delegations too -- in particular, the delegations of Brazil (ENDC/PV.172, pp. 39 et seq.) and the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.182, p.15) -- have made useful suggestions on the question of the reduction of the military budgets of States. The United States delegation also submitted in January of this year the five points of President Johnson (ENDC/120).

However, no progress has been reached in the negotiations on any of the proposals that have been submitted. In the field of collateral measures, owing to the opposition of the Western delegations no agreement has been reached, either, on the order of the consideration of individual proposals. In our view, the cause of this unsatisfactory situation lies in the negative position of the Western delegations towards all proposals submitted by the socialist countries, and in their unwillingness to take any effective measures in the field of disarmament or any steps to bring about a relaxation of international tension.

If we assess the negotiations from this angle, then it is obvious that, using all kinds of pretexts, the Western delegations have rejected the proposal for a reduction of the military expenditures of States and have taken a negative position even on the proposal that our Committee should adopt an appeal to governments of countries to reduce their military budgets, following the example of the Governments of the USSR, the United States and other countries.

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The attitude of the Western delegations has also stood in the way of our reaching agreement on effective measures to be taken to prevent a spread of nuclear weapons. The urgency and importance of such measures has been repeatedly stressed here by practically all delegations. Despite that, the Western Powers are carrying out policies which directly negate effective measures to prevent a dissemination of nuclear weapons, contradict the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on the subject, and make it possible for other States, and particularly for the West German militarists, to gain access to nuclear weapons through NATO and the so-called multilateral force.

The attitude of the Western delegations also constitutes an obstacle to reaching agreement on the significant proposal of the Soviet Union for the elimination of bomber aircraft (ENDC/123), under which effective physical destruction of weapons would take place without delay. The United States, for its part, has submitted a proposal (ENDC/PV.176, pp. 5 et seq.) for the destruction of obsolete United States B-47 bombers which in any case are scheduled to be withdrawn from service in the United States armed forces by the end of 1966, and the Soviet Union TU-16 bombers. The Committee has thus been faced with a situation where a measure motivated by the needs of the military policies of the United States and the re-equipment of its Air Force is being passed for initiative moves to the field of disarmament. Therefore, we believe that a number of delegations, including the representatives of some non-aligned countries, have rightly pointed out that the proposal of the United States is ineffective.

The Western delegations have equally evaded any discussion on the proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and those of NATO (ENDC/77), and they have also failed to give their answer to other proposals of the socialist countries contained in the memorandum of the Government of the USSR (ENDC/123), particularly the proposals for the withdrawal or at least the reduction of foreign troops in the territories of other States and a reduction of the armed forces of States. However, questions which are ripe for solution cannot be evaded by silence. Silence cannot remove those questions nor can it create a favourable atmosphere for the negotiations on other issues.

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This morning the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, tried to refute the arguments which we raised on 16 April against the presence of foreign troops on the territories of other States (ENDC/PV.184, pp.20 et seq.). Our main point was that under the existing conditions the security of the great Powers and of other States too is secured by the strategic nuclear weapons and their vehicles which are stationed mainly on the national territories of States. Mr. Burns was not able to deny this basic fact. He tried to prove that the presence of foreign troops was necessary for the defence of Western Europe, and repeated all the arguments we have heard many times in the past: inter alia, those about the alleged superiority of socialist countries in conventional armaments and about the geographical factor. He quoted some figures contained in a pamphlet issued by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, but in the same pamphlet he could very easily find figures which show that the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries are equal in manpower.

What, then, is the meaning of his argumentation? Despite all his attempts, he was unable to prove that the presence of foreign troops on other territories is necessary for the defence of the West. Every conflict in the very sensitive area of Europe would very probably develop into nuclear war in which only strategic nuclear weapons would be decisive. The socialist countries are therefore right when they point out that these troops are a potential source of tension and of aggravation of the international situation. Therefore they must be withdrawn.

Opposing the realistic proposals of the socialist countries, the Western delegations have submitted their own proposals, which, as has been proved, cannot constitute a basis for agreement. They are proposals which try to install the broadest possible control. They would not lead to a reduction of international tension and to the strengthening of mutual confidence among States; they would have quite the contrary consequences.

For instance, a typical example is the United States proposal for a verified freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/120). Very recently, on 23 April, the Czechoslovak delegation pointed out the serious shortcomings of the United States proposal and its unacceptability (ENDC/PV.186, pp. 7 et seq.).

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The representative of the United Kingdom reproached my delegation with having raised, as he alleged, the same objections to the freeze proposal in its elaborated form as the socialist delegations had raised in the past, and he affirmed that such objections were totally unconvincing. We should leave that statement unanswered.

Nevertheless, because the allegations of the United Kingdom representative were so unfounded and because they distorted the facts, we cannot pass over them in silence. We thoroughly studied the detailed elaboration of the United States proposal and, proceeding from that study, we stated our matter-of-fact observations indicating why that proposal was unacceptable. We leave it to the other delegations to judge whether or not our arguments -- which the representative of the United Kingdom tried to refute -- are well founded and convincing. However, it is a fact that, unlike Mr. Thomas, Mr. Fisher, the representative of the United States, tried to reply to some of our arguments also on 23 April, but he did not in the least weaken their validity. Anyone who studies the relevant part of the records (ibid., pp.40 et seq.) will see that clearly.

Referring again to the allegations of Mr. Thomas to the effect that the objections we raised are in substance old objections which the socialist delegations have made in the past, we cannot but state that we do not understand Mr. Thomas's reasoning. What did the representative of the United Kingdom expect? After all, the detailed information that Mr. Fisher gave us on 16 April (ENDC/PV.184, pp. 13 et seq.) on the proposal of the United States for a freeze revealed nothing new -- no substantial changes in the original proposal. Therefore one cannot wonder that we did not change our position on the freeze proposal and that we only became once more aware of the serious shortcomings of that proposal.

When we evaluate our work of the past three months in the field of general and complete disarmament, the picture is as unfavourable as that in our negotiations on collateral measures. There too, when our talks were resumed, we had favourable conditions for making progress. Those conditions had been created in particular by the new proposal of the Government of the USSR, submitted to the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly for the retention of a "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the disarmament process (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). That proposal constitutes a new and significant step towards meeting the demands of

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the Western Powers. It is another proof of the sincere, systematic effort of the Soviet Union Government to build a suitable basis for mutually-acceptable agreement.

Therefore the Soviet proposal has been highly evaluated by a majority of delegations. The acceptance of the principle of the "nuclear-umbrella", which the socialist delegations asked for and which was also recommended by the delegation of India, (ENDC/PV.177, pp.27 et seq.), would open the way to concrete negotiations on that proposal. However, the Western delegations have taken a negative stand on the Soviet proposal. The attitude of the Western Powers is in sharp contrast with the flexible position of the socialist countries and their endeavour to create a basis for mutually-acceptable agreement, which was manifested in a number of significant amendments to the original draft of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, the Western Powers continue to adhere to their proposal submitted in 1962 and have not made any significant change which would attest to their readiness to seek ways to reach a mutually-acceptable solution.

To bring about a change for the better in our Committee's work, it is particularly necessary that the Western Powers should finally pass from words to deeds and change their position, which stands in the way of adopting any effective measures. It is necessary that the Western Powers should finally realize that the implementation of general and complete disarmament is incompatible with their attempts to keep for themselves the possibility of waging a nuclear war throughout the disarmament process. Hardly any progress can be expected unless the Western Powers concentrate on disarmament itself and stop orienting themselves towards the introduction of control over armament and the maintenance of the so-called "present military realities", (ENDC/PV.179, p.14), which, as we have pointed out, is contradicting disarmament.

In the field of collateral measures, the Committee's negotiations may have positive results only on the condition that the Western Powers will show readiness to take really effective measures and will abandon their attempts to enforce their proposals which practically concentrate only on the introduction of control in different spheres and which aim at eventually gaining unilateral advantages. This also makes it necessary that the Western Powers should not subordinate their position on individual questions to the obstructionist attitude of aggressive West German circles which are obstinately opposed to any steps aimed at easing international tension.

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We cannot agree with the position of the Western delegations in their attempt at the end of our negotiations to create an atmosphere of optimism and satisfaction. The Committee's work may be evaluated only on the basis of the concrete results which it has achieved. If we apply this criterion, it is clear that the optimism of the Western delegations has no justification.

It is high time for this unfavourable situation to be radically changed. The agreements reached last year and the recently-announced decisions of the three Powers in the field of fissionable materials for military purposes (ENDC/131, 132) indicate that there are possibilities for solving outstanding individual issues. Those possibilities must not remain unused: that is one of the obligations of our Committee. It is necessary, however, that the Western delegations should review their position and should take such an attitude as would make it possible to embark upon a serious, business-like consideration of individual proposals and early agreement on such measures as would constitute effective steps towards halting the arms race, improving the atmosphere in international relations, and reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Today, at the last meeting of the present session, my delegation does not intend to review once again the proposals which we have put forward, or the opportunities for agreement which we have perhaps missed. I propose to confine myself to a few general remarks and to try to show that an examination of what this Committee has accomplished gives ground for hope.

Even today some representatives have expressed pessimism; others have gone so far as to be ironical about the results of our work. Such negative views are unjust and out of place. I believe that within the limits of our possibilities we have done our best, since we all realize the urgent need for disarmament. The Western delegations have upheld certain points which seem to them to be essential: namely the basic principles of disarmament, balance and control. But we have done so with due respect for the views of others, carefully trying to avoid controversy. Our colleagues of the East have sometimes succumbed to the desire for polemics, although we are glad to say that, generally speaking, these have been on a relatively restrained and moderate scale.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

As a result, the Conference was able to continue -- I might even say, enlarge -- its role as an effective factor in reducing tension and in bringing East and West closer together. The delegations of the non-aligned countries have co-operated particularly actively, and the Italian delegation wishes to express its appreciation of the ideas which they have contributed to the Conference at this session.

Developments at this session bear some resemblance to those which occurred at our last session. Last summer, after lengthy discussions on cessation of nuclear tests, the Committee was gratified to find that the proposals laid before it were partially accepted by the nuclear Powers with the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. We have witnessed a similar development this year. The complete cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes has been on our agenda since 1962. During the present session this proposal was submitted once again by the United States delegation, together with much detailed information. All the Western delegations gave ample evidence to show the value of this measure, which also received considerable support from the delegations of the non-aligned countries. Then, at a certain stage of our debates, the three nuclear Powers partially adopted the proposals submitted in the Geneva Committee. It would therefore be difficult to deny that this Committee has played a major part in these decisions.

In this connexion, I must say that I do not understand why Mr. Tsarapkin, the Soviet representative, this morning accused the Committee of being ineffective because, according to him, agreements and decisions relating to our work have been reached outside the Committee. I should like to ask him whether it was not, after all, his Government which chose Moscow for the signature of a treaty for which the Western Powers had submitted proposals at Geneva. And can he deny that his Government drew widely on the Geneva debates for these agreements and decisions? Can he say that the Soviet Government did not pay the slightest attention to the appeals made by delegations in this Committee for a ban on testing, stoppage of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and prohibition of the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit?

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Of course, the Committee wishes to play an increasingly active part in the decisions taken by the great Powers. But what matters most to the Committee is that its influence in favour of peace and of a reduction in tension should be effective and that concrete results should be achieved, whether at Geneva or elsewhere.

The tripartite decision announced jointly by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.185) presents us with a new procedure for advancing towards disarmament. This procedure seems to me to be midway between mutual example and agreement in the strict sense of the term. We appreciate its practical quality and concrete value. This procedure has, in fact, made it possible to carry out measures which we consider to be very beneficial. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy made the following comment on the decision of 20 April:

"Any progress made towards an easing of tension and a reduction in armaments is in accordance with mankind's profound desire for peace and with the true interests of the Italian people."

We hope, however, that our further work will make it possible to conclude genuine agreements, which will be subject to verification and will be final and binding. The results are important both in themselves and psychologically. The recent tripartite decision, following as it does the previous agreements on the cessation of the arms race in certain sectors, confirms the peaceful intentions of the nuclear Powers, inspires hope, and provides a stimulus for work at Geneva.

Although the results already obtained are gratifying, it may be asked why, in spite of the very favourable prospects at this session, the Committee has been unable to reach more comprehensive agreements. In my opinion, one of the causes -- and perhaps the main cause -- has been the persistent opposition of the Eastern delegations to control. Control is the key to disarmament. We insist on control, not because we wish for verification before disarmament, but because control is the most critical aspect of the problem. Destruction of arms is a difficult operation, but the organization of control as we envisage it -- namely, control which is effective but which does not endanger legitimate State secrets -- is even more difficult. I think that we shall have to re-examine the question of control thoroughly during the next session.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The Soviet delegation once accused me of not having adequately co-ordinated my views on the subject with those of the other Western delegations (ENDC/PV.183, pp. 26, 27). I should like to assure Mr. Tsarapkin that none of us in the West intends to ask for one iota more in the way of control than is strictly necessary to ensure the faithful implementation of agreed measures. The Eastern delegations appear to hold the mistaken view that only the effective destruction of weapons can call for and justify control measures. That is not so. Our work is beginning to take a realistic turn. We are beginning to realize that the very first agreements should logically deal with the cessation of the arms race. The further development of this favourable and very promising trend may be blocked by the question of control unless it is admitted that, even for agreements on the cessation of the arms race, some control is necessary, even if limited.

For special reasons, neither the agreements reached so far nor the decisions just taken called for any control measures. We are very glad they did not. But if we are to continue to progress towards ending the arms race, we shall have to study formulae for verification which meet the requirements of such measures. Opposition in principle to any control over the cessation of weapons production would be disastrous and would impede the favourable developments which are now in sight.

Those are the points on which I wished to touch briefly this morning: they deserve to be studied by all delegations during the recess. I was prompted to raise them by re-reading the statement made on 13 February by Mr. Agede, the Ethiopian representative, who said:

"... unless a solution is found to the problem of verification and control, it would be unrealistic to believe that any really significant progress could be made, be it on the implementation of any of the proposed partial methods ... or be it on means of constituting meaningful steps leading towards disarmament." (ENDC/PV.166, p.31).

Mr. Agede is entirely right. He has most aptly expressed the thinking of the great majority of delegations here.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

During the recess we intend to reflect at length, in a spirit of understanding, on all the problems discussed and on all that has been said here by all delegations, in order to see whether any new procedures are open to us or whether the old ones should be retained or modified. We hope that our partners will do likewise.

A special working group on disarmament has been set up in the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It will start its work at once under the direction of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and we hope to return well prepared, still willing to reach a compromise wherever compromise is possible, and firmly resolved to arrive at genuine, lasting, and constructive agreements.

We have, of course, no reason today to be entirely satisfied with the results of our work. We shall be entirely satisfied only when we have achieved general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. But neither do we have any reason to be discouraged or pessimistic, either at Geneva or elsewhere. The road to disarmament is very long and difficult. But for the first time in history a start has been made, by general agreement and in accordance with different, but effective, formulae on real and concrete action to halt the arms race. That is a result which, I believe, deserves respect and one which should be a source of inspiration and hope.

Before concluding, I should like to associate myself with the words of appreciation and thanks which have been addressed to Mr. Epstein and to all his colleagues in the Secretariat.

The meeting was suspended at 1.5 p.m. and resumed at 2.50 p.m.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I do not propose to repeat all the views expressed here by various members of our Committee in evaluating our talks. It cannot be denied that, after more than three months' work, the achievements of this session are hardly consistent with the favourable atmosphere which we all noted when we resumed our meetings. Certainly last year's agreements -- concluded outside the Committee, it is true --, and the recent

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decision by the Governments of the Soviet Union (ENDC/131), the United States (ENDC/132) and the United Kingdom to decrease the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, are likely to promote a détente and make it easier to achieve disarmament. These agreements have had, and are still having, a positive influence on the international situation.

At the same time, we cannot pass over in silence a series of actions and events pointing in the opposite direction: to a continuation of the arms race and the preservation of the nuclear threat. Indeed, we see a tendency towards an intensification of that threat, if we compare the present situation with that obtaining two years ago when the Committee began its work. Any doubts on that point are dispelled by the statement made by Mr. Fisher, the United States representative, on 16 April that the inventory of operational vehicles in the United States is increasing in 1964 by 550 per cent over the 1962 level and by 1965 will have grown to 750 per cent (ENDC/PV.184, p.14).

Although the existing nuclear weapons are enough to destroy all known animal and vegetable life more than ten times over, research on the development of new weapons of mass destruction is still continuing. Did not the United States Press recently mention the existence of a nerve-gas, a weapon so powerful that, even when used on a reduced scale, its effects would approach those of nuclear weapons?

Despite the reductions of military budgets announced this year by the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries, total military expenditure still exceeds \$120,000 million a year. There is no need to remind you of the benefits which a reduction of this expenditure would bring to all States. Because of the opposition of certain Western delegations, the Committee has not even been able to agree on issuing an appeal to governments to reduce their military expenditure. Are facts like these likely to promote general disarmament and increase mutual trust among States? Is this the way to make it easier for the Committee to carry out the task assigned to it with the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the historic resolution on general and complete disarmament under strict international control? Any objective examination of these trends points to a negative reply.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

On reviewing this session, I think we may conclude that a trend towards the conclusion of agreements in the direction of disarmament has begun to emerge. The need for such agreements is becoming ever more imperative. The fact that our Committee has given special attention to agreement in principle on the elimination of the nuclear threat at the very first stage of disarmament -- a process which would entail the material destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles, as proposed by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries -- constitutes implied recognition of the decisive importance of nuclear disarmament to the entire process of disarmament. Was it not the need to clarify this vital aspect of the matter which caused the deadlock in negotiations on the preparation of the text of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, a task which was not resumed during this session?

It has become increasingly obvious that, in present circumstances, the peace and security of all States largely depend on the manner in which this question is resolved. So long as the Western Powers consider that the "rough balance" on which the present precarious peace is based can be preserved only by retaining a deterrent, and so long, therefore, as peace is regarded solely in the light of strategic considerations, it is difficult to see how we can make progress towards general disarmament, in which all countries and all peoples are vitally interested.

Although, in our view, the talks at this session have made this fact clear, the Committee is far from having exhausted all the possibilities of resolving these difficulties, which must not be regarded as insurmountable, however great they may appear to be. Together with the delegations of the other socialist countries, the Romanian delegation will make every effort to help in removing the existing difficulties, and will also give due attention to any proposal likely to further the cause of disarmament and ensure the genuine security to which all States are entitled in equal measure.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

Where collateral measures are concerned, our Committee has had before it at this session a considerable number of proposals and suggestions. The number and scope of these proposals provide additional evidence of the possibilities open to us. But we have been unable to reach agreement even on the order in which these problems should be discussed. I do not now intend to go into all the causes of this state of affairs. In my delegation's opinion, one of them was the failure to observe the elementary principle that, among the highly complex problems of disarmament, priority should be given to the basic issues. This category includes -- and my delegation has already had occasion to express its views on this subject -- those measures which are likely to lead to a genuine relaxation of international tension, a halt in the arms race, and increased security and mutual trust among States, but which do not raise questions of control, balance and peace-keeping machinery.

I shall give a few examples. There is the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77). The delegations of the socialist countries have stressed the importance of such a pact. The exceptional influence which such a pact would have on the entire international situation has been emphasized by other delegations, including those of Burma, Ethiopia, Nigeria, India and the United Arab Republic. Equal importance seems to have been attached to it by the other nuclear Powers, in view of the undertaking they assumed in the Moscow Communiqué of 30 July 1963 (ENDC/101) to consult with their allies to that end. But, although nearly a year has passed since the assumption of that undertaking, the Western delegations, as has already been stated here, continue to bring the same totally unfounded arguments against this proposal as in the past.

It is no secret that the existence of opposing military groups fosters the arms race and is a source of distrust and tension in international relations. I am sure no one can deny that, without in any way affecting the existing balance, such a pact would establish conditions conducive to the solution of other major problems, for instance the withdrawal of troops stationed in foreign

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territory, the dismantling of foreign military bases, reductions in armed forces, and the prevention of surprise attack. The implementation of this measure, which takes account of the present realities and lack of trust, would certainly increase the security of States and hence their mutual trust, a matter so frequently mentioned in this Committee.

If the States members of these groups were to undertake not to attack each other and to refrain from the use of force, prospects would open up for the development of relations among States on the basis of equal rights and of respect for each other's sovereignty and independence -- that is, on the basis of precisely those principles on which the United Nations is founded. It is on the strength of these principles that we can establish international co-operation, which, today more than ever, is a necessity for all States. The conclusion of the pact would thus create prospects for the elimination of the present opposing military groups, which can be regarded only as a passing phenomenon.

None of the arguments so far put forward can justify a refusal to agree to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. As has been repeatedly stated, the signature of such a pact would not involve recognition of the German Democratic Republic by those States which are not yet prepared to do so. As was recently stated by the Soviet representative (ENDC/PV.184, p.33), the Soviet Government is ready to adopt a very flexible position on the form of the pact.

Then what possible justification is there for the attitude of the Western Powers? The difference between the two systems? It has existed in the past and will continue to exist. Moreover, the collapse of colonialism has led to a far-reaching process of national regeneration. The many peoples involved in this process have the sovereign right to choose a system and a way of life in conformity with their aspirations. The only way to protect humanity from a new war is to practise peaceful co-existence between States with differing social systems, and to renounce all plans for aggression or for the imposition of a certain way of life by force.

There are, of course, other very valuable proposals which would, if carried into effect, promote a détente in international relations, help to reduce the

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threat of war, and facilitate the execution of general and complete disarmament. They include the proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world, to which the Romanian Government has attached and continues to attach special importance, as shown by the efforts it has made to bring about the establishment of a zone free from nuclear weapons in the Balkans. I should also like to recall the Ethiopian Government's proposal that a conference should be convened for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons (A/RES/1909(XVIII); ENDC/116). I consider that this proposal merits full attention.

My delegation is convinced that if we all show goodwill and perseverance in the search for mutually advantageous solutions, any problem can be resolved. The agreements recently concluded prove that the difficulties mentioned in regard to certain collateral measures are not insurmountable. These agreements bear eloquent witness that progress can be made if we show goodwill and do not exaggerate the importance -- which no one denies -- of the problems of control, equal security for all, and peace-keeping machinery, which interest the socialist countries at least as much as their Western partners.

Was that not the approach adopted at the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, a treaty which, in our firm opinion, should be extended to underground tests? Was that not the approach adopted when agreement was reached to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117)? Was that not the approach adopted when the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom decided to decrease their production of fissionable materials for military purposes? Such advances should increase the Committee's prospects of success.

In any case, the Committee must try to join its efforts to those I have mentioned. It cannot ignore the overwhelming desire of all the peoples of the world for peace, or the similar trend in other international bodies which are called upon to deal with the major problems of our time: the normalization of international relations, and the creation of favourable conditions for peaceful co-operation among all peoples.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

In a message addressed to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Chairman of the State Council of the Romanian People's Republic, Mr. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, said:

"Man has at his disposal today immense material resources with which, and with the extraordinary conquests of science, he could easily eliminate from our planet the economic underdevelopment which breeds poverty, illiteracy and disease. In order that these possibilities may become realities available to each people and to each country, it is necessary to end the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament..."

It is in this spirit that the Romanian delegation has sought to contribute to the fulfilment of our Committee's tasks at this session. It will continue to work towards that end.

Before I conclude, I must thank you, Mr. Chairman, and your co-Chairman, Mr. Tsarapkin, for your valuable work and for your efforts to keep the members of this Committee informed of your consultations. I should also like to express my satisfaction at the atmosphere which has prevailed at this session. We consider that the valuable suggestions and exchanges of views will not merely pin-point the divergences between the various positions, but will rather make it easier to achieve successes which will justify the trust placed in the Committee.

The Romanian delegation warmly thanks the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who through his representative has encouraged the Committee in its work. We also wish to express our sincere thanks to the interpreters, the verbatim reporters and all the members of the Secretariat for their valuable contribution, which was of great assistance to us in our work.

We have now come to a pause in our work. The Romanian delegation shares the view that this must not be a holiday but, rather, a period of deep **reflection** with a common end in view, that of finding the best solutions to the problems we have discussed. Perhaps this will enable us better to understand that, in our negotiations, we must show persistence and perseverance and that there can be neither victors nor vanquished. Victory can go only to the spirit of co-operation and the achievement of disarmament, which is the sure path to peace and is vital to all mankind.

Mr. NEHRU (India): As I am speaking for the first time since the people of Bulgaria suffered their recent loss, I should like on behalf of the Indian delegation to offer our sincere condolences to the Bulgarian delegation on the death of the Chairman of the Presidium, Mr. Dimitri Ganev.

We have heard ~~many~~ interesting statements at today's meeting, and I should like to assure my colleagues that we shall study those statements carefully. This is our last meeting of the present session, and we are carrying out today a review of our work during the session. The next session of the Conference will be important, as we are approaching the time when a report will have to be made to the General Assembly. The review which we are carrying out today will help us to prepare during the recess for greater progress in the next session.

All our colleagues have referred to the favourable conditions which existed when our session commenced. The limited agreements of last year had helped to bring about an improvement in the international situation. There was some further improvement as a result of the announcement of unilateral cuts in military expenditure by the Soviet Union and the United States. The changes made by Mr. Gromyko in the Soviet disarmament plan (END/2/Rev.1(Add.1) were also welcomed as a constructive step. Thus, in Secretary-General U Thant's words, there was an atmosphere of détente when our Conference resumed its work. The Secretary-General in his message to us stated his conviction that it should be possible for us in the new conditions to take additional concrete steps and to present new proposals and new ideas (ENDC/PV.157, p.6.)

Our basic task during the session was to maintain and to strengthen the improvement that had taken place. Many proposals were made to this end. But in spite of our discussions, which have lasted for three months, we have not reached any agreement in the Conference or taken any concrete step. This has led some of our colleagues to question the value of our discussions. They have expressed their deep disappointment at the lack of progress in our work. Other colleagues, while regretting that greater progress has not been made, do not regard the session as a failure. We ourselves share the general sense of disappointment. But the real problem, as we see it, is how to ensure greater progress in the future. As regards our work in the past, we think that it might be useful to consider some of the difficulties which we have experienced.

Mr. Nehru (India)

First, while there is a welcome improvement in the international situation, greater confidence among the nations has still to be established. Lack of confidence, especially among the great Powers, inevitably comes in the way of our work. It shows itself at times in the discussion of proposals which have been placed before our Conference. Some of the proposals are good in themselves, but seem to show a greater slant in favour of one side as opposed to the other. This is perhaps unavoidable. But if in the course of further discussions some readjustments could be made, or more than one proposal could be considered simultaneously, so as to meet the requirements of each side in a spirit of mutual accommodation, more rapid progress might be possible.

Secondly, there is the question of our methods of work. We have had general discussions which take the form of statements and counterstatements by each side in the Conference. Some of the proposals, however, seem to call for greater exploration in depth by means of technical and other studies. This has been opposed by one side on the ground that such studies might lead to the shelving of a proposal. It may be true, as has been suggested, that unless there is some agreement, or at least understanding, in regard to the principle underlying a proposal — or, if I may put the same idea in less controversial terms, on the basic approach to a specific problem — a technical study might not yield results. However, the fear that has been expressed that such a study might be used to shelve a proposal does not seem to be well founded. The presence of the non-aligned countries in the Conference is some sort of guarantee that shelving will not take place.

Thirdly, it appears that while our Conference is meeting there is a parallel dialogue going on outside the Conference between the great Powers. This dialogue seems to have extended to some matters which have formed the subject of discussion in our Conference. While no agreement has been reached in our Conference, partial agreements on these very matters have been reached among the great Powers. We welcome the parallel dialogue and also the agreements which have been reached. Presumably, questions put by one side to which no answer is given in the Conference are being answered in the course of this dialogue.

Perhaps some indirect solution has been found to the problem created by what Mr. Burns once described as the "dialogue of the deaf". So far as agreements are concerned, it does not matter very greatly whether they are reached in our Conference or outside. The important thing is to have an agreement. But it

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might create a better understanding of our work and help to reduce the sense of frustration from which some of us seem to suffer if, in cases where an agreement is reached outside our Conference, the fact could be recorded and made known to the world that it is based on or has taken into account the discussions in our Conference.

Recently, a fourth agreement was reached outside our Conference in regard to the reduction of fissile material manufacture. Although the cuts will be unilateral, the agreement is essentially based on one of the proposals which we have discussed in our Conference. It cannot be said, therefore, that our discussions have been of no value. They have helped the great Powers to reach some important agreements. The great-Power dialogue which seems to be going on presumably extends to some other proposals which we have also discussed in our present session. There is no agreement yet, but we hope that the discussions will lead to greater progress in our next session or, alternatively, in direct negotiations between the great Powers.

I am mentioning some of these proposals briefly. Under general and complete disarmament we are discussing the question of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. As we all know, this is the crux of the disarmament problem, and we have been asked by the General Assembly to deal with this problem with a sense of urgency. The need for urgency arises from the fact that the problem of nuclear armaments seems to be in danger of getting out of hand. Closely connected with the question of elimination are two proposals made by the United States which we are discussing as collateral measures. These proposals relate to the stoppage of the production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and of fissile material for weapon use (ENDC/120). There are other proposals in the nuclear field with which I shall deal later.

For the present, I propose to confine myself to the elimination and stoppage of production. These three questions in our view could be considered together. Their purpose, as we understand it, is to reduce the menace of nuclear armaments and the nuclear arms race. With regard to the nature of this menace, Mr. Foster -- when he was leading the United States delegation -- gave us some details (ENDC/PV.170, pp.46 et seq.). In 1962 when our Conference started, the accumulation of vehicles and other nuclear armaments had already reached a dangerous level. It was a growing awareness of that danger, which is different in kind from that of other armaments, which led to the convening of our Conference. The difference, if I may say so, is as great as -- if not greater than -- that between the bows and arrows of which Mr. Burns once spoke and conventional modern armaments.

(Mr. Nehru, India)

However, to come back to Mr. Foster's statement, he pointed out that while for two years we have been discussing this question the nuclear arms race has been going on. During these two years the United States strategic missile inventory has increased by more than 200 per cent; in another three years the total increase since 1962 will amount to 750 per cent (ibid., p.48). Mr. Foster also referred to Chairman Khrushchev's statement that in the Soviet Union missiles were coming out like sausages from a machine (A/PV.900, para.189). This was a picturesque way of saying that humanity was on the verge of committing suicide.

We have no details regarding the production of other nuclear armaments, such as fissile materials for weapon use. It may be assumed, however, that stocks on both sides have reached a level greatly above the point of danger. This is the background against which we have to consider the question of stoppage of production, as well as elimination. Stoppage of production by itself will not remove the danger. The accumulated stocks are enough to destroy the world many times over. Nor will elimination of stocks remove the danger if further production also is not stopped. We may deal with these questions separately, whether as collateral measures or as disarmament, but they are essentially part of the same problem: the problem is how to eliminate or to reduce the grave threat which has been created by the production and accumulation of nuclear armaments.

In regard to the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, the solutions proposed by the two sides are to some extent divergent. It is our hope that further discussions and a fuller consideration of the problem will help to narrow the gap. The United States position is that in the process of disarmament nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments should be placed in the same category; reduction and elimination should be gradual and on a uniform percentage basis. Our United States colleague has informed us that this is the only way of preserving balance in the three stages of disarmament.

The Soviet position is that nuclear delivery vehicles present a special problem: they constitute a greater danger than other armaments, and their elimination or reduction to the level of a minimum deterrent should have the highest priority. In fact, the Soviet view is that the deterrent should be established in the very first stage of disarmament. Whether reduction on such a scale can actually be carried out in the first stage has still to be determined. There

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are other questions also, such as the size of the deterrent, the question of location, preservation of balance, verification, peace-keeping machinery and so on.

All these questions will require further discussions and technical studies. They cannot be answered in the course of general discussions. The technical studies or discussion of details will, in our view, be more fruitful if there is some agreement on the basic approach to the problem. The idea underlying the United States approach to the problem of production -- if we have understood it correctly -- is that we are facing a grave danger and that this danger should be dealt with as a matter of high priority. The proposal in regard to the stoppage of production applies both to fissile material for weapon use and to nuclear delivery vehicles. However, in regard to vehicles, it is restricted to strategic vehicles. This is an important point of detail which will no doubt be discussed further.

We should welcome both these measures if they could be adopted under conditions which are acceptable to both the sides. As far as vehicles are concerned, could not the proposal be extended in scope so as to meet the objection that a restricted measure might give some unilateral advantage to one side over the other? However, the point I wish to make is that the United States approach seems to recognize the special problem created by the nuclear arms race. Stoppage of production in some sectors is being treated as a matter of high priority. Could not the same approach be made in regard to the elimination or reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles?

The reduction of all types of armaments, whether nuclear or conventional, must of course take place on the basis of the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). That has been accepted by both the sides. Is it right, however, to assume that differential rates of reduction or a faster rate for more dangerous armaments would necessarily create an imbalance? Conversely, is it right to assume that uniform rates would necessarily help to preserve the balance if the defence structures of the two sides were asymmetrical or not uniform? These are matters which seem to need further examination and study.

With regard to the basic approach to this problem, it seems to us that it would be only logical, and it would also help to reduce the danger of a nuclear conflict which threatens the world, if both elimination or reduction, and stoppage of production of nuclear armaments, could be linked together in some way and be

(Mr. Nehru, India)

dealt with as a matter of high urgency and on the basis of a higher priority. The linking together might also meet the objection which has been raised to verification without disarmament, which is one of the main obstacles to progress in our discussions. The idea of a "nuclear umbrella", which we have supported (ENDC/PV.177, pp.27 et seq.), implies in our view that some way should be found to reduce the present dangerous accumulation of nuclear delivery vehicles to the level of an agreed minimum deterrent, on the basis of the Agreed Principles, at the earliest possible stage of the disarmament process, and that under the shade of this "umbrella", which would provide additional security, disarmament in other fields which are less dangerous should be carried out. It is our belief that some way could be found on the basis of the Agreed Principles, and without infringing any one of them, if the same high-priority approach were adopted for the reduction of vehicles to a less dangerous level, as has been suggested in the United States proposal for the stoppage of production of certain types of missiles or vehicles.

There are other proposals in regard to bomber aircraft which are capable of being used as carriers of nuclear weapons, on which a statement was made by our colleague from the United Arab Republic, and we fully support his suggestions (ENDC/PV.182, pp.10-12). The United States proposal is that two obsolete types of bomber aircraft should be destroyed (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.). The Soviet Union has proposed the complete destruction of all bombers (ENDC/123). We presume that the Soviet proposal is restricted to heavy bombers owned by the great Powers which are capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Our colleague from the United Arab Republic made the suggestion that there should be a phased programme for the elimination of such bombers: this should start with the elimination of obsolete types; simultaneously there should be an agreement for stoppage of production and for a carefully-phased programme for the elimination of all bombers. His suggestions are of value, and we hope they will receive more thorough consideration at the next session.

There are other proposals in the nuclear field on which I should like to say a few words. No discussion has taken place in our Conference regarding underground nuclear tests, and we have no report from the nuclear Powers on the progress they have made in their negotiations. In fact, we do not even know whether any negotiations have taken place. What report are we going to make to the General

(Mr. Nehru, India)

Assembly, which has asked us to deal with this question with a sense of urgency (A/RES/1910(XVIII); ENDC/116)? We hope that this question will be taken up at our next session. If there is disagreement on the question of inspection, surely it should be possible for the nuclear Powers to consider the suggestions which have been made for closer co-operation in the scientific field with a view to determining which underground tests are capable of being detected without on-site inspection and bringing such tests within the scope of the ban imposed by the Moscow Treaty. Even some limited progress in this field would help to create greater confidence and improve the international situation.

Another proposal in the nuclear field on which progress seems to be possible is the one relating to non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. We understand that some negotiations or talks have taken place between the nuclear Powers on this question. Both the nuclear Powers have expressed a desire to prevent, and shown their interest in preventing, the further spread of nuclear weapons. Both have supported the Irish resolution on the subject (A/RES/1665 (XVI)). There may be difficulties in regard to the interpretation of the resolution. Does it, for instance, permit some change in the existing deployment or disposition of nuclear weapons, or in regard to giving access to others so long as control of the weapons is not transferred?

Irrespective of the question of interpretation, however, it seems to us that at the present time, when there is a progressive improvement in the international situation, it would be most unwise -- and might even bring about a setback -- if any change were made in the existing arrangements for the control, use or deployment of nuclear weapons. In our view this is a matter in which the special concerns of one side should be respected by the other. An agreement on non-dissemination which freezes all existing arrangements pending an agreement on the reduction and elimination of nuclear armaments is a logical next step to the Moscow Treaty which would be welcomed by the world as a whole.

I am going rapidly over a few other proposals on which some progress might be possible. We have already, at a previous meeting, welcomed the United States proposal for a cut-off of fissile material for weapon use and the transfer of the material to peaceful uses (ENDC/132). My predecessor spoke on this subject; and, as he pointed out, while we agree that proper verification to prevent the use of fissile material in weapons should be applied, the verification or

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safeguards should not be such as to place checks on the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy (ENDC/PV.174, p.18). The International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should also not be extended to equipment and devices which serve a peaceful purpose. Safeguards of that kind would have the effect of widening the gap between the developed and under-developed countries and would be a source of further tension (ibid., p.19).

We should also support the proposal for the setting up of observation posts to prevent surprise attacks (ENDC/130). This is a useful measure which at one time seemed to be acceptable to the Soviet Union. Perhaps it might be easier to reach an agreement on such a measure if some other measures which are equally useful could also be considered. One such measure which we have in mind is the Polish proposal, which is being discussed between Governments but which has not yet been formally placed before the Conference, for some sort of freeze of nuclear weapons and production facilities in a limited area in central Europe. A freeze of this kind would be consistent with our larger aim of reducing the danger of a nuclear conflict. Some other measures also have been discussed in the present session; but it does not appear that they are likely to be agreed to in the near future. It is desirable at the present time to confine ourselves to measures which show greater promise.

Our Soviet and other socialist colleagues have spoken at some length on the need for international agreement on cuts in military budgets. Alternatively, they have suggested that an appeal might be made to all States to reduce their military expenditures. My delegation has already explained its position on this matter (ENDC/PV.170, pp.28, 29). We welcome such cuts in principle, and we should also welcome unilateral cuts in military expenditure by any country which is in a position to make them. We ourselves in India, however, are not in such a position at present. We have suffered a military attack and are continuing to face the threat of aggression. This has forced us to increase our military expenditure, which has always been on the low side. This increase is designed to ensure the security of our country and is limited to our essential defence requirements. We are sure that our colleagues will agree that the strengthening of a country's defences and its firm resistance to an aggressive Power which has only recently denounced the very idea of the renunciation of force in the settlement of territorial and other disputes as a "fraud" is consistent with our larger aims and is a contribution to peace.

(Mr. Nehru, India)

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank both you and your co-Chairman, Mr. Tsarapkin, for your great kindness and the courtesy you have always shown to all of us. I also thank, on behalf of the Indian delegation, Mr. Epstein, the members of the Secretariat and the interpreters for their great assistance to us and the devoted work they have done to ensure the success of our Conference.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I should like, first of all, to express our gratitude to the delegations of Nigeria and India, which have offered their condolences to the Bulgarian people upon the death of the Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly, Mr. Dimitri Ganev.

The Bulgarian delegation shares the view of those who consider that the recess in the work of the Committee will be beneficial if used for a thorough study of ways of achieving tangible results after the resumption of our activities. We have had an opportunity to state our views (ENDC/PV.186, pp. 29 et seq.) about the reasons for the failure of the Committee to make any progress at all after more than three months of discussion. While we have no desire to enter into a controversy on the subject of pessimism and optimism, we are bound to say, however, that we cannot agree with a forced optimism which sounds almost like the idea "the worse things are, the better". We cannot agree with that sort of optimism where the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee is concerned.

However unpleasant it may be, we have to admit that the Committee has not achieved any practical results at this session, particularly in accomplishing its main task -- the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. It may be said that during the past three months there have even appeared signs of a disregard for this fundamental question. The allusions to the exceptional difficulty and complexity of the problem and to the great length of time required to solve it, the obvious preference for so-called collateral measures, not to mention the naive assertions that the abolition of weapons would not mean an end to war since somewhere people would still use primitive bows and arrows -- all this cannot be assessed in any other way than as a desire to postpone, if not to evade completely at the present stage, the main question -- disarmament.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

As the United States delegation has pointed out (ENDC/PV.184, p. 13), we are faced with a paradox and, I would say, an unpleasant paradox: during the time the Disarmament Conference has been working, armaments and expenditures on armaments have been increasing in the world, resulting in increased danger rather than increased security. There are also well-known statements made by many Western leaders to the effect that in the era of thermonuclear weapons any military adventure would be tantamount to suicide, that in a thermonuclear war there would be no victors, and that such a war could wipe whole countries and nations off the face of the earth.

Here is the real paradox in the position of the Western countries: on the one hand they admit that the armaments race does not lead to security and peacefulness; and on the other they do not accept proposals which could eliminate the danger of a thermonuclear war. On the one hand they state that the existence of heavily-armed military and political groups has not led to greater security; and on the other they defend the maintenance of these groups and their thermonuclear potential until the end of the disarmament process. Lastly, on the one hand they accept that thermonuclear weapons make it necessary to revise all previous proposals for the maintenance of peace; and on the other they seek for the maintenance of peace in the very existence of thermonuclear weapons. That has been the unchanged position of the Western Powers over the past two years and practically since 1960. It is precisely that position that has brought the negotiations to a standstill at this session of the Committee as well.

Nevertheless, the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) affords a possibility of finding a way out of the impasse. The very fact that this proposal, having been approved by many delegations at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, has been discussed for three whole months in the Committee and has received support not only from the socialist countries, bears witness to the possibilities which this new manifestation of good will on the part of the Soviet Union opens up for achieving rapid and substantial progress in the disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Lukarev, Bulgaria)

Our position is clear: we are happy to see any progress in the field of collateral measures. But in the first place a detailed analysis of the proposals submitted up to now has shown that, whereas the Soviet proposals envisage effective measures and do not seek any unilateral advantage, in the United States proposals there is always an element of unilateral self-interest. Secondly, collateral measures, for all their importance, are aimed at facilitating a solution but not at solving the main problem, which is disarmament.

Therefore, what we can look forward to doing when the Committee resumes its work is, besides seeking for mutually-advantageous partial solutions, to deal in earnest with the preparation of a disarmament treaty on the basis of the declarations, resolutions and views of the majority of the members of the United Nations concerning the need to eliminate the danger of nuclear war as a matter of priority, and to bring about as quickly as possible general and complete disarmament, which is the surest safeguard of peace.

I desire, in conclusion, to associate myself with all the delegations which have thanked the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and all the members of the Secretariat for their efforts and their efficiency, which have enabled the Eighteen-Nation Committee to carry out its work as smoothly as possible.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I had not originally intended to speak during today's debate; but, as we are now perhaps under a little less pressure as regards time than before, I may be permitted to take a few minutes of the Committee time. I promise to be very brief.

On behalf of the delegation of the United Kingdom, I should like to say that I heartily join the previous speakers in thanking our two co-Chairmen for all the hard work -- and it has been hard work -- which they have put in on our behalf and on behalf of the Committee as a whole during the past session. It is work which I personally think has not been unfruitful; I very much hope that they too consider it to have been useful.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I should also like to associate the delegation of the United Kingdom with what has been said to Mr. Protitch and Mr. Epstein and to all their colleagues on the Secretariat and translation staff of this Conference for all they have done to help us in our work -- a task which, as Mr. Tsarapkin has said, has been greatly complicated by the existence of the large Conference which is sitting in close proximity to us.

Apart from that, I have only one or two general statements to make. I should say at the outset that I do not propose to discuss, or even to mention, the many proposals which have been put forward, during the session which is now closing, by various representatives in the Committee. We have all undertaken, as I understand it, to discuss and consider in our own households, so to speak, the various proposals -- from whatever quarter they come -- in an objective and impartial spirit.

What I do want to touch on is something which was referred to just now, if I may say so, in very wise words by the representative of India. The Committee will recall that at the first meeting of this session, on 21 January 1964, the leader of the delegation of the United Kingdom, Mr. Thomas, expressed the earnest hope that it would be possible during this session to discuss the many questions which would come before us with the utmost possible degree of flexibility, and to give ourselves the chance to study seriously all the important technical issues which would arise from one time to another (ENDC/PV.157, pp. 24, 25). That is a plea which has been repeated from time to time by the United Kingdom delegation during this session, and notably by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Butler, when he visited the Committee on 25 February (ENDC/PV.169, pp. 9, 16-18).

I do not like to assume consent or assent to propositions which are put forward by ourselves, but I think it fair to say that those suggestions have commanded a good deal of sympathy from various members of the Committee. I recall a statement to that effect by the Swedish delegation (ENDC/PV.160, pp. 16 et seq.; PV.174, pp. 8 et seq.). Indeed, I thought that much of this was implicit, even if not explicit, in the extremely comprehensive and thoughtful address which the representative of Nigeria made this morning.

However, those procedural suggestions have not been followed, and if I feel any sense of disappointment at the work of this session -- and I am far from sharing some of the of the more extreme expressions of disappointment that have been uttered from time to time around this table -- it is because of the lack of possibility of making

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

progress along the lines which we suggested. Had it been possible to adopt those suggestions, or at any rate some of them, I am absolutely convinced that our balance-sheet -- if we may put it like that -- would have been more satisfactory than it is at present.

There has in fact even been difficulty from time to time, as we all know, in having what might be called a proper dialogue on the important points which have been put forward by one side or the other. Often it has been the case that the Western side -- if one must so call it -- has put forward propositions on which we have invited questions, but the questions seldom seem to come. Instead we have met with a tendency on the part of our colleagues to make up their minds about what they consider to be our propositions without full exploration of them. On the other hand, when we have heard important propositions put forward by our colleagues of the Soviet bloc -- and they are in many cases very important -- how often have we asked question after question to try to elicit the real meaning, and how often have we found difficulty in securing answers?

I do not say this has always been the case. There have, indeed, been honourable exceptions, and perhaps I may mention two. The Polish delegation has always seemed to be very ready to study and to put forward a series of interrogatories to try to ascertain what we in the West have had in mind, and these have in turn led to valuable discussion. As far as my Soviet colleague is concerned, I recall, if I may say so, that by the exercise of a certain degree of pertinacity I have managed to extract from him some answers and some information on the question of the so-called Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) which I have gladly put in my store of such knowledge as I have of it and on which I hope to be able to build as time goes on.

None the less the general position remains, I fear, as I have stated it. I noticed that this morning the representative of Czechoslovakia was inclined, as I understood it, to feel somewhat aggrieved because at our last meeting Mr. Thomas suggested that Mr. Zemla's answers at that same meeting to the United States representative's explanation of the proposals for a freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles had not been either serious or objective and that they had been, as Mr. Thomas said:

"... directed solely towards finding the same objections that had been made before ..." (ENDC/PV.186, p. 36).

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Of course, one fully accepts that the representative of Czechoslovakia had studied what had been said by the United States delegation. Had he, on the other hand, asked anybody any questions about them? If he had asked any questions, I think they must have been only questions which he asked of himself; and if that was so I find it not too difficult to understand that the result had been that he had not changed his point of view. But why had it not been possible for the representative of Czechoslovakia to ask questions of the representative of the United States? He, I have no doubt, would have been only too glad to give the further explanations which might have helped not only the representative of Czechoslovakia but the Conference as a whole to understand better what are, as we all agree, extremely complicated proposals.

I know that this process of suggesting that one should engage in a dialogue, that one should ask questions, that one should try to probe in depth, is often called by our Eastern European colleagues a process of time-consuming or of time-wasting. But surely it is worth spending time in order to try to ascertain the facts. If that is so, to call such spending of time a wasting of time is merely to beg the question before it has been possible to give an answer.

Disarmament, after all, is not a simple or an easy subject. If we do not try to work along those lines, it seems to me, we simply have the following position. One delegation says, "I say this", and another delegation says, "I say that". If that is so, I should be inclined to call that technique -- and I think in this I may be following something which was once said by the representative of Canada -- the "say-so" technique, and I am bound to say that I have never participated in or even read of a conference which succeeded along those lines.

I do not wish to labour the point further. As far as the United Kingdom delegation is concerned, we shall carefully study, as I have said, all the proceedings of this session; and I hope and think that the result of that will be that we shall come back here in June with many more questions to ask our colleagues who have put forward important proposals of their own. In that event I hope that it will not be considered as a reproach and that indeed our colleagues will respond in time, so that we may find ourselves working next session with an ease and with perhaps even an informality which has been sadly lacking up to now. If that be the case, I for one have no doubt that the work which we shall be able to accomplish in the summer will be both substantial and lasting.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): That concludes the list of speakers, and I should now like to say a few words in my capacity as representative of the United States.

Today we are recessing for six weeks of hard work. For our part -- and I am sure this is true of all the delegations here -- the recess which lies ahead will be as demanding of our time and energy as the past three months in Geneva.

During the past three months this Conference has had placed before it a wide variety of disarmament measures. We have subjected those measures to intensive exposition and debate, and it has been useful that we have done so. This process of exposition and debate has now brought us to a point at which we can profitably turn to an evaluation of our respective positions. The study, scrutiny and consultation within our own governments which will go into this evaluation are an essential corollary of our work as a committee. That we take the time to do it at this stage in our deliberations will increase the prospects of our work's being productive when we reconvene on 9 June.

This Committee has recently heard some rather pessimistic statements concerning the work and prospects of this Conference. Some of our members have stated quite forcefully that the progress of the Conference is not fast enough. We should all be aware that there are no quick solutions, no easy solutions, to the highly complex problems which confront us here. For its part, the United States sees no reason for pessimism. We believe that with patience, determination and ingenuity we shall continue to make progress towards disarmament. We also know that if those of us around this table did not feel that this was so, we should not be here in the first place.

It is true, of course, that nothing of value can come from this Conference unless it is acceptable to both sides. In view of that fact, many of you may feel that, in the face of pessimism on the other side, even an air of cautious optimism -- to use words that have been used before in this session -- is artificial. I would submit, however, that there is nothing in the history of this Conference that makes an air of cautious optimism artificial. I would submit further that if there has been any indicator which the history of this Conference has proved to be unreliable, it has been not cautious optimism, but rather, indeed, an air of pessimism. Periods of pessimism have preceded most of the major accomplishments which have grown out of this Conference. Let me give just a few examples.

(The Chairman, United States)

The idea of a limited test ban had been discussed in connexion with the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests as early as 1959, without any affirmative results. When a draft for a limited test ban treaty (ENDC/59) was submitted in this Conference on 27 August 1962, it received a rather negative response. In the autumn of 1962, and indeed until the end of the spring of 1963, there was a general air of pessimism concerning the possibility of reaching any agreement of this kind. As we all know, a limited test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963.

Proposals which would have prevented the placing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space were made as far back as 1957. The United States and the Soviet Union were for a long time quite far apart on measures of that kind. Yet, last autumn, the Soviet Union and the United States joined in sponsoring a United Nations resolution against the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in space (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117). That resolution was passed by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 October 1963.

The special communications link was one of a group of measures to reduce the risk of war (ENDC/70) which were proposed to this Conference in December 1962. There was at first a certain difficulty and unwillingness to consider any of those measures outside the context of general and complete disarmament. Later, it was agreed that the communications link should be discussed separately, and an agreement was reached under which that communications link is now operating (ENDC/97).

Proposals for a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes had been made repeatedly, and to no apparent avail, since 1956. Last week the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union concurrently announced cut-backs in production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes.

Now, we must acknowledge that progress has often been slow, but we must also acknowledge that progress is a fact. We must also acknowledge that in all this progress the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has played an important part. We can hope for further progress in the future, and perhaps with less lapse of time, as a result of our continuing endeavours. Whether this hope turns into reality will depend upon the co-operative efforts of all of us. As regards their number, their variety and their flexibility, we have before us a wealth of opportunities in the proposals before this Committee. Our efforts during the recess should be to analyse those proposals, to confirm their strengths and to correct their weaknesses.

(The Chairman, United States)

We must stretch our minds and our imaginations to reconcile our interests and to find the adjustments that will lead to further progress. Only by so doing can we fulfil our duty and our obligations to those who anxiously await the results of our work.

That concludes the substantive portion of my remarks. Speaking still as the representative of the United States and as one of the co-Chairmen, I should like to express thanks to the delegations for the kind remarks that have been made about the work of the co-Chairmen, and my appreciation to my colleague for his co-operation -- because this is an institution in which two have to function and which cannot function without two.

Speaking now as Chairman, and on behalf of the members of the Committee, I would ask the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General to convey to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and through him to all the able and hard-working members of the Secretariat, and particularly to the verbatim reporters and interpreters, our thanks for their efforts on our behalf.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 187th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, representative of the United States of America.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Poland, the Soviet Union, Nigeria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Romania, India, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 9 June 1964, at 3 p.m."

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.

